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INTRODUCTION
The city and its department of correction now stand at a historic
crossroads. New York City’s jail system, largely symbolized by the
persistently violent and inhumane conditions in the massive jail
complex on Rikers Island, is an ongoing source of public shame.1 But
after years of crime and incarceration reduction,2 closing the jail
facilities on Rikers Island and reimagining the New York City
Department of Correction (“DOC”) now has become a realistic
possibility.
Constant litigation and a number of accounts of violence and
mistreatment of those held in the DOC’s custody prompted a loud
and sustained cry for reform. Perhaps no story galvanized this public
call more than the story of Kalief Browder, first published in The
New Yorker in October of 2014.3 Browder was sixteen years old
when he was arrested and charged with robbery, grand larceny, and
assault.4 He was held on $3000 bail and spent three years on Rikers
Island waiting for his trial, unwilling to plead guilty to crimes he did

1. See Anna Mae Duane, The Shame of Rikers: The Odious 19th-Century
History of Rikers Island Provides Just One More Good Reason to Shut It Down,

SLATE (July 13, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/
2017/07/rikers_island_is_the_northern_equivalent_of_confederate_monuments_but_
worse.html [http://perma.cc/3PPP-E82R].
2. Michelle Mark, New York City Is Proof That Cities Don’t Need to Lock Up
Tons of People to Drive Down Crime, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 5, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-nyc-managed-to-lower-incarceration-and-crimerates-at-the-same-time-2016-11 [http://perma.cc/G9XX-7ML9].
3. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law
[http://perma.cc/
7NCL-DJVN].
4. Id.
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not commit.5 During that time, he experienced brutality at the hands
of other inmates and staff, and spent months in solitary confinement,
attempting suicide several times.6 Browder’s case, though eventually
dismissed, shined a spotlight on the failures of New York City’s
criminal justice system, and Browder’s suicide in June of 2015
furthered public outrage about both the conditions on Rikers and the
excessive delays in the city’s court system.7
The ever-present claims of abuse and poor conditions of
confinement on Rikers Island prompted former City Council Speaker
Melissa Mark-Viverito to set up the Independent Commission on
New York City Criminal Justice and Incarceration Reform
(“Commission”), which was to be led by former Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, Jonathan Lippman.8 The Commission
began its work in April of 2016 and began exploring whether or not
closing Rikers Island was possible, what new jail facilities should look
like and where they should be located, how the city would pay for it,
and if closing the jail was possible, what would become of it.9
In April of 2017, the Commission outlined an ambitious and
comprehensive blueprint for reforming the city’s criminal justice
system.10 The plan calls for shuttering the jails on Rikers Island and
demolishing the other jails currently operated by the DOC off the
island in order to develop a new smaller, safer, and effective
incarceration system for New York City.11 At the center of this plan
are the Commission’s recommendations for dramatically reducing the
5. See id.
6. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder Learned How to Commit Suicide
on Rikers, NEW YORKER (June 2, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/kalief-browder-learned-how-to-commit-suicide-on-rikers
[https://perma.cc/
P9SG-MKYS].
7. See id.; Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Rikers
Island for 3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-islandfor-3-years-without-trial-commits-suicide.html [https://nyti.ms/2jHSU4B].
8. Melissa Mark-Viverito, Speaker, N.Y.C. Council, State of the City Address at
the Samuel Gompers Campus, South Bronx, N.Y. (Feb. 11, 2016),
http://mtprauhwprtlcouncil.nyc.gov/html/pr/021116mj.shtml [http://perma.cc/VK9BNPJE].
9. See Indep. Comm’n on N.Y.C. Criminal Justice & Incarceration Reform,
About Us, A MORE JUST N.Y.C., http://www.morejustnyc.com/about-us/#aboutus/rethinking-rikers-island [http://perma.cc/R733-ZEUV].
10. See generally INDEP. COMM’N ON N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE &
INCARCERATION REFORM, A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY (2017) [hereinafter A
MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY], https://static1.squarespace.com/static/577d72ee2e69
cfa9dd2b7a5e/t/595d48d1e6f2e1e5bcaa411a/1499285717652/Lippman+Commission+
Report+FINAL+Singles.pdf [http://perma.cc/85JG-4ASN].
11. Id. at 14.
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daily jail population by almost half, from its current population of
approximately 9500 to 5000, and developing new a state-of-the-art
borough-based system with detention facilities in each of the five
boroughs.12 According to the Commission’s plan, Rikers Island
would no longer have jail facilities but would be redeveloped to
expand LaGuardia Airport and replace obsolete, borough-based
public infrastructure with next-generation infrastructure on the island
(i.e. wastewater treatment plants and power storage, composting, and
waste-to-energy facilities).13
Under the Commission’s plan, new jails would be located near
courthouses and public transportation, thereby easing the operational
burden on the DOC and increasing access to the jails by attorneys,
service providers, and visitors.14
Existing jails in Manhattan,
Brooklyn, and Queens would be replaced with new buildings, and
entirely new facilities would be constructed on Staten Island and in
the Bronx on city-owned land.15 This new built environment would
be based on, and incorporate, more humane design principles such as
direct supervision.16 Direct supervision is both a facility design and
management approach based on the prevention of violence through
relationship building and communication skills, freedom of
movement for the incarcerated population, and a normalized
environment for everyone—from detainees to DOC staff to visitors—
spending time inside jails.17 The Commission also called for the
development of a new, dedicated DOC training academy as well as a
longer, more robust training process for line officers and managers.18
This presents an opportunity to completely reimagine the role of the
DOC and its staff to align with a vision for a more legitimate criminal
justice system.19
After publicly announcing his support for closing Rikers in late
March, New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio released his own
roadmap for closing Rikers Island in June of 2017 and formed a task
force to implement the roadmap’s recommendations.20 The roadmap

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 13–19.
Id. at 107–12.
Id. at 17–18, 71.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 78–82.
Id.
Id. at 85–86.
See generally id. at 17–19.

OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, CITY OF N.Y., SMALLER, SAFER, FAIRER: A
ROADMAP TO CLOSING RIKERS ISLAND 5 (2017) [hereinafter SMALLER, SAFER,
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primarily focuses on the criminal justice reforms necessary to reduce
the population to a point at which Rikers Island could, feasibly, be
closed.21 Many of these recommendations track those of the
Commission.22 The mayor’s roadmap also outlined the importance of
a built environment and culture change, though it was silent on where
the new jails would be located.23 When the mayor released this
report, he also announced the formation of a task force to implement
the policy changes outlined in the mayor’s roadmap.24 Importantly,
there will be a dedicated committee developing and implementing
recommendations for culture change.25
However, reducing the population and developing new, state-ofthe-art facilities in the city’s five boroughs—closer to families,
attorneys, and resources such as employment and mental health
services providers—are reforms that will not, on their own, solve the
deeper problems that have long troubled the DOC. Although much
of the current criticism of the DOC focuses on a rampant “culture of
violence” that has persisted on Rikers Island, the jail complex’s
problems are symptoms of the violent, overly punitive, and neglected
correctional system that operates throughout the DOC jails.26 All
DOC jails—not just those on Rikers Island, but also the existing
facilities operated in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan—have
high levels of violence, are in various states of decay, are outmoded,
and are marred by inhospitable conditions for those held and staff
alike.27
Simply closing Rikers Island and the existing borough facilities and
moving to a borough-based jail system will not bring long-term
reform.28 In tandem with the criminal justice reforms outlined by the
Commission and in the mayor’s plan, the city must take difficult and

FAIRER], https://rikers.wpengine.com/wp-content/uploads/Smaller-Safer-Fairer-1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/PW9P-REYG].
21. Id. at 8–9.
22. Id. at 4–5.
23. Id. at 39.
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id.
26. The Mayor’s Management Report (“MMR”) is a mandated report released
twice a year to provide a public account of the performance of city agencies. For the
DOC, data aggregates violence metrics across the entire system and does not
separate by facility or island versus non-island facilities. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF
OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 84–89 (2017) [hereinafter MMR
2017], http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2017/2017_mmr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W897-7UY5].
27. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 71.
28. See infra Section I.A.
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concrete steps to address the organizational culture that exists at the
DOC, regardless of geography.29 This includes addressing the core
issues of violence, mismanagement, and inefficiency that have long
plagued the DOC itself.30 Reform through piecemeal litigation or
policy change—strategies that have driven past reform efforts at the
DOC, while achieving some important results, have never successfully
addressed many of the DOC’s underlying, deep-rooted problems.31
Organizational culture consists of the beliefs, assumptions, and
values that guide an organization’s operations and affect how its
members think and act.32 Culture involves the unspoken ways that an
organization solves its problems, and the assumptions and habits that
members, including new members, share and adopt.33 Culture is
fundamental to an organization’s operations, although it is often
mistakenly overlooked or else not prioritized in efforts to change an
organization. This Article will explore this concept of culture change
through the lens of historical reform efforts, in order to firmly
establish the importance of addressing culture and corresponding
operational challenges as the city contemplates closing the Rikers
Island jail facilities.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of
the history of violence of New York City jails, past efforts for reform,
and current recommendations for reform. Part II presents the idea of
comprehensive reform through cultural change, both outlining its
tenants and detailing how it can be applied within the DOC to
achieve lasting positive changes.
I. HISTORICAL CONDITIONS AT NEW YORK CITY JAILS
Part I will outline the conditions in the jails throughout the DOC,
the history of litigation, historical reform efforts, and current reform
plans as outlined by both the Commission and the mayor. Section I.A
describes the conditions in the DOC jails on Rikers Island and
throughout the boroughs, including the legacy of violence and neglect
and efforts at reform from the 1970s to 2014. Section I.B details the

29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.A.

CAROL FLAHERTY-ZONAS ASSOCS., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., BUILDING
CULTURE STRATEGICALLY: A TEAM APPROACH FOR CORRECTIONS 15 (FlahertyZonas ed., 2007).
33. EDGAR H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 7–21(4th
ed. 2010).
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Nunez v. City of New York 34 litigation, describing the complaint and

the federal consent decree under which the DOC is currently
operating. Section I.C outlines the current agenda for reform as
embodied in the Commission’s recommendations and the
recommendations outlined in the mayor’s roadmap to close Rikers
Island.
A. Conditions at DOC: Historic and Continuing Challenges

One ever-present challenge of Rikers Island is its geographic
isolation. Rikers Island functions as New York City’s penal colony,
with ten facilities located on a remote 413-acre piece of land perched
in the East River between the Bronx and Queens.35 The majority of
the population—over seventy-five percent—are being held there pretrial, meaning that they have not yet been convicted of a crime.36 The
island’s remote location contributes to delays in court processing time
for felony and misdemeanor cases, inhibits access to attorneys and
programming, and discourages visits by family.37 It also results in an
“out of sight, out of mind” approach to the city’s jail system that is
unsafe and unproductive for those who are held and those who work
there.38
But remoteness and isolation are only part of the deep-rooted
problems troubling Rikers Island. The facilities on Rikers, which first
opened as a jail complex in the early 1930s, are in deep decay.39
Facilities throughout the system have rotting floorboards,
malfunctioning heating and cooling systems, sewage backups, leaking
roofs, broken showers, and flooded bathrooms.40 This decay has led
to harmful conditions for those incarcerated,41 and has created an
inhospitable environment.42 This inhospitable environment is further
worsened due to the lack of basic services, such as heating in winter

34. 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
35. A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 103.
36. Id. at 33.
37. Id. at 73–75.
38. Id. at 14.
39. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., History of DOC, http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/about/
history-doc.page [http://perma.cc/VB2B-RL73].
40. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 72.
41. For example, the broken materials provide opportunities for people to make
weapons. See id. at 72.
42. See Raven Rakia, A Sinking Jail: The Environmental Disaster That Is Rikers
Island, GRIST (Mar. 15, 2016), http://grist.org/justice/a-sinking-jail-the-environmentaldisaster-that-is-rikers-island/ [http://perma.cc/MYW3-QYFC].
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and air conditioning in summer.43 In addition to decaying and
dangerous facilities and the lack of basic services, incarcerated
persons are typically housed in multi-occupancy cells with no privacy,
and the jails have little space for social services that are best practice
in a modern correctional system.44
Even worse, the people held on the island endure physical and
mental abuse, a rampant culture of violence, and overly punitive
conditions.45 This has included alarming rates of force used against
adolescents, rampant inmate-on-inmate assaults, and correction
officers using blows to the head and force as punishment or
retribution in response to verbal altercations with officers.46 In
addition, there is a link between jail conditions and the violence that
occurs within the facilities both by staff and by those held in the
facilities.47
For example, the deteriorating physical conditions
throughout the system provide an opportunity to fashion weapons
from light fixtures, radiators, and sprinkler heads; in fact, most of the
weapons found inside the jails in 2014 were improvised from
materials already inside the jails.48 For both staff and those held,
these punishing conditions, in addition to the rampant violence, have
persisted for decades; those held on Rikers Island have described the
island using terms such as “hellhole,” “torture island,” and “the land
that time forgot.”49
These problems are not confined to Rikers, nor do they only
impact those who are incarcerated. These problems also lead to an
inhospitable environment for correction officers (“COs”) and other
DOC staff. City data demonstrates that, like the facilities on Rikers
Island, borough-based facilities also are marred by pervasive violence

43. See id.; Brad Hamilton, Cell Damage: Rikers in Ruins After Years of Neglect,
N.Y. POST (Jan. 13, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/01/13/cell-damage-rikers-in-ruinsafter-years-of-neglect/ [http://perma.cc/2654-66KG].
44. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 13, 77.
45. See U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE S. DIST. OF N.Y., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIPA
INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS JAILS ON
RIKERS
ISLAND
3
(2014)
[hereinafter
SDNY
RIKERS
REPORT],
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20
Rikers%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QPB-2VDK].
46. Id. at 4.
47. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 72.
48. See id. at 72.
49. See id. at 27; see also Jonathan Lippman & Melissa Mark-Viverito, Opinion,
Closing Rikers Island Is a Moral Imperative, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/opinion/closing-rikers-island-is-a-moralimperative.html [https://nyti.ms/2nFxqVW].
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and by decaying and outmoded conditions.50 While the average daily
population has steadily declined, rates of violence in the DOC have
persisted. There are a number of explanations for violence in the
facilities, between COs and those held and between inmates,
including inability to appropriately manage the population due to
inadequate training and management of staff and deteriorating
facilities across the DOC.51 As on Rikers Island, the borough-based
jails are generally inhospitable, with deteriorating buildings, broken
heating and cooling systems, harsh lighting, and reverberating
surfaces.52 And with the exception of the Manhattan Detention
Center, all the DOC facilities are based on now obsolete design
principles with a linear layout that makes curbing violence difficult.53
Figure 1, below, shows the historical violence trends in the DOC
over the last two decades. The trends are based on what the system
calls “stabbings and slashings.” This is inmate-on-inmate violence
with the use of a weapon (usually some type of razor or homemade
knife).54 If stabbing and slashing rates are high, it is also quite likely
that all use of force, unjustified use of force, and attacks on COs will
also be high.55 The opposite is also true, if stabbing and slashing rates
are low, use of force will be low.56

50. Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer 2015 Analysis:
Violence at City Jails Spikes Dramatically and Cost per Inmate Explodes Even as
Inmate Population Declines (Oct. 16, 2015), http://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/
comptroller-stringer-2015-analysis-violence-at-city-jails-spikes-dramatically-and-costper-inmate-explodes-even-as-inmate-population-declines/
[http://perma.cc/WG5TLLHK].
51. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 73.
52. Id.; see also, e.g., Daniel Beekman, Bronx’s Notorious Spofford Shut Down,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
bronx-notorious-spofford-aka-bridges-juvenile-center-finally-shut-article-1.119333
[https://perma.cc/6WQD-47Z6].
53. Linear jails typically contain cells lined up along corridors, so that correction
officers cannot easily monitor groups consistently. Richard Wener et al., Direct
Supervision of Correctional Institutions, in PODULAR, DIRECT SUPERVISION JAILS
INFORMATION PACKET 1–8 (Nat’l Inst. of Corr. ed., 1993).
54. N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK CITY JAILS: STABBING AND
SLASHING INCIDENTS 2 (2015) [hereinafter VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–2014],
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Violence%20in%20New%20York%20
City%20Jails_Slashing%20and%20Stabbing%20Incidents.pdf [http://perma.cc/HLP7G6HC].
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id.
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Figure 1. Historical Violence Trends at the DOC, as Measured by
Stabbing and Slashing Incidents.57

As shown, while the average daily population has steadily
decreased since fiscal year 1995, violence rates, which peaked at over
59 stabbings and slashings per 1000 inmates in 1995, declined to a low
of under 2 per 1000 inmates from 2003 to 2009.58 After an initial

57. See MMR 2017, supra note 26, at 72–74; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS,
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 81 (2016) [hereinafter MMR 2016],
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2016/2016_mmr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/57LL-MUPB]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S
MANAGEMENT REPORT 82–83 (2015) [hereinafter MMR 2015], http://www1.nyc.gov/
assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr2015/2015_mmr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SG3MSRCK]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT 143–44
(2008) [hereinafter MMR 2008], http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/
pdf/mmr/0908_mmr.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9XC-SR66]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF
OPERATIONS, MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATOR
TABLES 76 (2004), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr/0904_
indicators.pdf [https://perma.cc/D82M-9WUB]; MAYOR’S OFFICE OF OPERATIONS,
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT: SUPPLEMENTARY INDICATOR TABLES 71 (2002),
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/mmr/0902_indicators.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4HW-YF3X]; VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–2014, supra note 54,
at 2; Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice, Average Daily Jail Population in New York
City, 1980–2017, CITY OF N.Y. (Jan. 1, 2018), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
criminaljustice/downloads/pdfs/population_reduction_sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8L47-C4A7]; NYC Department of Correction at a Glance, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR.
(Apr. 27, 2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doc/downloads/pdf/DOC_At-Glance-427-17.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y87N-QKAT].
58. See MMR 2008, supra note 57, at 143–44; VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–
2014, supra note 54, at 2.
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dramatic decrease in violence rates, and a leveling off, the DOC has
seen a steady increase in violence since fiscal year 2009.59 Since 2009
violence rates have steadily increased to over 17 per 1000 inmates in
2017, a thirteen fold increase from 2008.60 While still not close to
1995 levels, the trend is deeply concerning.61 These conditions,
coupled with the changing needs, particularly those related to
behavioral health, of people cycling through the system, have
developed a reputation for the DOC as a hopeless institution for staff
and inmates alike.62

1.

A Legacy of Violence, Neglect, and Litigation

The troubling and inhumane conditions in New York City jails are
not new. Before the bridge to Rikers Island was constructed in 1966,
the majority of pre-trial detainees were housed in borough jails.63
The Manhattan House of Detention (“the Tombs”), once was as
notorious as Rikers Island due to its severe overcrowding and poor
conditions for both inmates and officers.64 In the late 1960s, the
Correction Officers Benevolent Association (“COBA”), New York
City’s union for correction officers, urged the DOC to address the
jail’s deteriorating conditions, severe understaffing, and a lack of new
officer training.65 The DOC made attempts to expedite case
processing times to address overcrowding at the Tombs, but did little
else to address rising tensions within the facility.66 In 1970, tensions
came to a head as an inmate uprising at the Tombs brought public
attention to the overcrowding, officer brutality and racism, overly
punitive conditions of confinement, and deteriorating environmental
conditions.67 Those held were “locked-in” to their cells twenty-four

59. See MMR 2017, supra note 26, at 84; MMR 2015, supra note 57, at 82;
VIOLENCE IN N.Y.C. JAILS 2009–2014, supra note 54, at 2.
60. See MMR 2017, supra note 26, at 84; MMR 2008, supra note 57, at 143.
61. See MMR 2008, supra note 57, at 143–44.
62. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 71.
63. The Long-Term Plan for Borough Jails and Rikers Island, Hearing Before the
N.Y.C. Council Comm. on Fire & Criminal Justice 1 (Apr. 25, 2006) (statement of
John Boston, Dir., Prisoners’ Rights Project, The Legal Aid Soc’y).
64. See John Surico, The Legacy of Violence at the Manhattan Jail Known as the
‘Tombs,’ VICE NEWS (July 19 2015), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/tales-fromthe-tombs-the-legacy-of-violence-at-the-manhattan-detention-complex-719
[http://perma.cc/QAM9-F6H6].
65. John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails, in
COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL
INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS, 144 (John J. Dilulio, Jr., ed. 1990).
66. Id. at 143.
67. Id.
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hours per day, meaning they were unable to leave their cells at any
time for exercise or family visits, and some were not taken to court
appearances.68 They were denied showers and shaves, as well as
access to religious counseling.69 Sick calls were also unavailable.70
Finally, people were served sandwiches rather than normal dinner
menus and were forced to eat in their cells.71
Mounting tensions, overcrowding, and poor conditions led to a
series of lawsuits in the second half of the twentieth century and the
early part of the twenty-first century challenging the conditions of
confinement and treatment of those held at jails both on and off
Rikers Island. In 1970, the Legal Aid Society filed a federal classaction lawsuit, Rhem v. McGrath,72 against the DOC for conditions at
the Tombs in Manhattan.73 The suit—the first in a series of federal
class action lawsuits brought by the Legal Aid Society (“Legal Aid”)
against the DOC over four decades—resulted in a 1973 consent
decree, which addressed the issues related to overcrowding,
unsanitary conditions, and medical care.74
In 1974, after the city failed to submit adequate plans for
compliance with the consent decree, presiding Judge Morris E.
Lasker of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York ordered the Tombs to be shut down.75 Judge Lasker
understood that the changes under the consent decree would require
significant planning and funding, and found that it was apparent that
the city would not develop a plan for a reform.76 The city appealed
Judge Lasker’s decision citing a lack of adequate resources.77 The
Second Circuit upheld Judge Lasker’s decision holding “that
inadequate resources did not justify the state’s deprivation of
constitutional rights.”78 Furthermore, the 400 men still incarcerated
68. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Another uprising occurred at Queens House of Detention later that same
year. See John Sibley, Prisoners Seize Hostages, Take Over Jail in Queens, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 2, 1970), http://www.nytimes.com/1970/10/02/archives/prisoners-seizehostages-take-over-jail-in-queens-prisoners-take.html [https://nyti.ms/2nDfATK].
72. 326 F. Supp. at 681.
73. See id. at 684.
74. Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for
Federal Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees,
52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3, 19 (2007).
75. See Dilulio, supra note 65, at 149.
76. See Baer & Bepko, supra note 74, at 20.
77. Id. at 21.
78. Id.
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at the Tombs were transferred to the House of Detention for Men
(“HDM”) on Rikers Island, where conditions—like overcrowding,
deteriorating physical conditions, and disciplinary procedures—were
just as poor as at the Tombs.79
As the city budget crisis of the early 1970s worsened, action to
address conditions of confinement was delayed, and in 1975, the most
destructive inmate uprising yet erupted on Rikers Island.80
Corrections Commissioner Benjamin J. Malcolm was able to
negotiate an end to the protests, which arose out of complaints from
inmates due to overcrowding and conditions in the facilities, and
avoid bloodshed by agreeing to address the grievances of those
incarcerated.81 After the uprising, the DOC was forced to move
people to other DOC facilities while repairs were made to large holes
in cells and other debris was cleaned up.82 But COs on Rikers Island
staged a walkout to protest the fact that the DOC had not issued a
plan to address the unsafe working conditions in the facilities.83
Following that uprising, Legal Aid filed a new federal class action
lawsuit, Benjamin v. Malcom,84 alleging that conditions at the HDM
were also unconstitutional.85 The Koch administration negotiated a
settlement agreement that would cover all of the city jails on and off
Rikers Island.86 In 1978, a consent decree was agreed to by all parties
and in 1979, Judge Lasker approved and entered the consent
judgment.87 Two critical issues covered by the consent decree were
overcrowding and developing policies for the treatment of those held
at HDM.88
In 1983, Legal Aid brought Fisher v. Koehler,89 alleging that the
DOC used excessive force on individuals incarcerated in the
Correctional Institution for Men (“CIFM”), now the Eric M. Taylor
79. Benjamin v. Malcolm, 564 F. Supp. 668, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
80. See Tom Goldstein, 318 Prisoners Are Transferred from Riot-Damaged
Rikers Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/29/archives/
318-prisoners-are-transferred-from-riotdamaged-rikers-jail.html
[https://nyti.ms/
2GglNOr].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Peter Kihss, Rikers Island Revolt Ends with Release of Hostages, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 25, 1975), http://www.nytimes.com/1975/11/25/archives/rikers-islandrevolt-ends-with-release-of-hostages-rikers-island.html [https://nyti.ms/2Fbyjxi].
84. 495 F. Supp. 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
85. Id. at 1360.
86. See Baer & Bepko, supra note 74, at 23.
87. Id. at 23–24.
88. Id. at 24.
89. 692 F. Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Center, on Rikers Island.90 Judge Lasker also heard this case and
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that use of force was excessive
and “that the pervasiveness of staff-on-inmate violence was the
predictable result of defendant’s policies and practices . . . .”91 In
1985, Legal Aid brought a similar case, Jackson v. Montemagno,92
against the DOC claiming abuse of the incarcerated population by
staff at the Brooklyn House of Detention.93 The case was settled in
1991, referencing the agreement reached in Fisher, requiring the
DOC to develop and implement systems for controlling and
investigating use of force incidents and disciplining COs for
unnecessary or excessive force.94
In 2003, the DOC and the Urban Justice Center also settled a class
action suit, Brad H. v. City of New York,95 which had been brought in
state court claiming that the city failed to provide adequate discharge
planning as part of their care for those with a diagnosed mental
illness.96 While this case covered the DOC as a whole, it again
targeted a specific population, i.e., those with a diagnosed mental
illness.97 A settlement agreement was reached that required the
DOC to develop a discharge plan based on an assessment for those
individuals’ needs for continued treatment and support services,
public benefits, and appropriate housing.98 The DOC was also
required to provide assistance and access to the services set forth in
the plan.99 A monitoring team was established that continues to
monitor progress towards the agreement, and the thirty-seventh
monitor’s report was filed in June of 2017.100

90. Id. at 1519; see also Facilities Overview, CITY OF N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doc/html/about/facilities-overview.shtml [https://perma.cc/
R9RU-7XL4].
91. Id. at 1564.
92. Stipulation of Settlement at 3, Jackson v. Montemagno, CV 85-2384
(E.D.N.Y. 1991).
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Stipulation of Settlement at 2, Brad H. v. City of New York, No. 117882/99
(Jan. 8, 2003), 2003 WL 5582869.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id.
100. See Thirty-Seventh Regular Report of the Compliance Monitors at 6, Brad
H., No. 117882/99 (June 6, 2017). For public access to the full docket, see Brad H. v.
City of New York, URBAN JUSTICE CTR., https://mhp.urbanjustice.org/mhpbradH.v.cityofnewyork [https://perma.cc/8S5J-6LWS].
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In 2012, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York (“USAO”) began an investigation into the
treatment of adolescent males between the ages of sixteen and
eighteen held on Rikers Island.101 The investigation, pursuant to the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act,102 focused on excessive
and unnecessary use of force by the DOC COs and supervisors,
whether the DOC adequately protects adolescent males from
violence by other inmates, and whether the DOC’s reliance on
punitive segregation subjects young people to excessive risk of
harm.103 At the conclusion of the investigation, the USAO sent a
letter to Mayor de Blasio, DOC Commissioner Ponte, and
Corporation Counsel Zachery Carter, outlining the findings of their
report.104 The USAO concluded that there was a pattern and practice
of conduct that violated the constitutional rights of adolescents held
on Rikers Island.105 The adolescents were not adequately protected
from serious physical harm from the “rampant use of unnecessary and
excessive force by DOC” and were also not protected from harm
caused by violence from other inmates.106 Furthermore, the USAO
found that the DOC relied too heavily on punitive segregation,
placing adolescents in solitary confinement “at an alarming rate and
for excessive periods of time.”107 Generally, the investigation
revealed that a deep-seated culture of violence was pervasive
throughout the adolescent facilities on Rikers Island.108

2.

Efforts at Reform: 1970s to 2014

Between the 1970s and 2014, the federal court made efforts to
reform the DOC through its judicial opinions and through the
implementation of judicial oversight. For example, in the early 1980s
the federal court monitored implementation of policy and practice
changes under the terms of the settlement agreements in Benjamin
and Fisher, discussed above. However, those cases only covered
policy and practice in specific facilities rather than across the DOC as

101. See SDNY RIKERS REPORT, supra note 45, at 1.
102. See generally Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997–
1997(j) (2012).
103. See SDNY RIKERS REPORT, supra note 45, at 1–2.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.; see also discussion infra Section I.B.
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a whole.109 Then in 1990, Judge Lasker held that the city violated an
order prohibiting the housing of incarcerated individuals in nonhousing areas, including gymnasiums and receiving areas, and found
that the violence at CIFM was caused by overcrowding, inadequate
staffing and supervision, excessive reliance on dormitory housing,
lack of adequate classification, and inadequate systems for
controlling, investigating, and disciplining staff misuse of force.110 In
1989, Judge Lasker approved a new use-of-force policy to address the
violence at CIFM, under Fisher, and in 1990, during the population
surge at the DOC, imposed a series of fines holding that the DOC
had violated his order prohibiting the housing of individuals in nonhousing areas.111 In the early 1990s, the DOC began addressing other
condition-of-confinement issues including the provision of food
services, access to the law library, environmental health (sanitary
conditions, ventilation, lighting, and extreme temperatures), attorney
visitation and confidentiality, placement of pre-trial detainees in
restraints, fire safety, and modular housing units.112
In 1982, under the Malcolm case, Judge Lasker ordered the
creation of the Office of Compliance Consultants (“OCC”), to
oversee implementation of the consent decree requirements.113 The
OCC was designed to be an agency of the city, not the court or the
DOC, with leadership appointed by the city and staff from the
DOC.114 This agency was designed to allow for greater cooperation
among the city, Legal Aid, and the DOC.115 Because it was
considered a relatively neutral party, the OCC was successful in
inducing the DOC to adopt reform strategies, though these reforms
only chipped away at the DOC’s entrenched culture.116
In addition to court oversight, the New York City Board of
Correction (“the Board”) provides more general oversight of the
DOC, separate from court oversight. Originally established in 1957
by Mayor Robert F. Wagner, and expanded in 1977 under Mayor
Beane, the Board is a citizen watchdog agency to set and enforce
minimum standards for the DOC. 117 The minimum standards seek to
109. See supra Section I.A.1.
110. See Baer & Bepko, supra note 74, at 27.
111. Id. at 28–29.
112. Id. at 36.
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id. at 25–26.
115. Id. at 26.
116. Id.
117. About the BOC, N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/boc/about/
about.page [https://perma.cc/8W2Q-YBW4].
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ensure the care, custody, correction, treatment, supervision, and
discipline of those held in the DOC.118 The Board fulfills this mission
through the evaluation of the DOC’s performance and operation of a
system for hearing grievances and issues from the DOC, both from
those incarcerated in the DOC facilities and from the general
public.119 Made up of nine members appointed by the mayor and the
city council, the Board has the right to access any DOC data or
records and the right to inspect and visit any DOC facility at any
time.120 The Board continues to incorporate best practices into its
minimum standards, including those related to the use of force and
punitive segregation, as well as the provision of basic necessities to
ensure proper conditions of confinement.121
The Board sets
minimum standards, but its success as an oversight agency has been
limited primarily because it lacks strong mechanisms to actually
incentivize compliance or to enforce its rights to obtain data and
documentation from the DOC.122
These reform efforts function primarily through litigation and
reflect a largely backward-looking responsive policy approach rather
than a forward-looking comprehensive approach to reform at the
DOC. There are many external factors that contribute to this
reactive policy approach. A primary factor is the ever-changing
nature of leadership in public bureaucracies, which makes stability
hard to come by.123 The DOC is an agency within city government,
and its commissioner is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the
mayor.124 This means that the highest rung of DOC leadership can
change every four years, or less, depending on the performance of the
commissioner or on the number of terms the appointing mayor
serves.125 Many of the staff, however, stay much longer.126 In the

118. Id.
119. N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., A STUDY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION
INMATE GRIEVANCE AND REQUEST PROGRAM 1 (2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
boc/downloads/pdf/final_board_of_correctionreport_oct2016.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
CYG3-8EVG].
120. N.Y.C. CHARTER §§ 626, 626(c)(1) (2004).
121. N.Y.C. BD. OF CORR., supra note 119, at 1.
122. See generally id. at 12–14.
123. ROBERT J. LAVIGNA, ENGAGING GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: MOTIVATE AND
INSPIRE YOUR PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 58–60 (2013).
124. See Baer & Bepko, supra note 74, at 23.
125. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 6 (2004).
126. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CITYWIDE ADMIN. SERVS., WORKFORCE PROFILE REPORT
160 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcas/downloads/pdf/misc/workforce_profile_
report_fy_2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/ELW8-QUQZ].
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absence of consistent leadership from above, default subcultures can
develop within the staff that set standards for operations.127
B.

Nunez: The Complaint, the Consent, and the Monitor

Ever worsening conditions and the recent spike in violence,
coupled with press attention to a number of high-profile incidents,
prompted Legal Aid to file a new class-action lawsuit in 2011 known
as Nunez v. City of New York in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York.128 That lawsuit resulted in a consent decree
that outlined a number of areas for reform to address the pattern and
practice of permitting violence across the DOC.129 To oversee the
reform, the consent decree also appointed a monitor who reports
progress and remaining challenges back to the court on a bi-annual
basis (“Monitor”).130 The complaint and resulting consent decree will
be discussed in turn.

1.

The Complaint

In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that a pattern and practice
of unnecessary and excessive use of force by uniform staff, including
COs, captains, and wardens, existed and was knowingly permitted
and encouraged by the DOC supervisors in the jails and at the highest
levels of the DOC.131 They further alleged that the DOC supervisors
created and perpetuated a deeply entrenched pattern and policy of
permitting uniformed staff to use unlawful, excessive force against
inmates with impunity.132
To support these allegations, the complaint cited previous litigation
that had exposed a culture of routine and institutionalized violence
against inmates by staff, a failure of accountability at all levels, and
deliberate and calculated indifference to constitutional violations.133
The complaint argued that if the relief obtained by the respective
classes in the previous litigation had been sustained, the
unconstitutional conditions and culture would have been

127. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 18.
128. See Amended Complaint, Nunez v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y.
filed May 24, 2012) (No. 15).
129. Consent Judgement, Nunez & United States v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 249).
130. Id. at 51.
131. See id. at 1.
132. Id.
133. See Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 2–5, 26.
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addressed.134 The complaint cited to specific failed reforms such as
staff training, video monitoring, thorough investigations into serious
uses of force by staff, discipline for staff who violate the DOC’s useof-force policy, staffing practices to ensure those who violate the useof-force policy have little to no contact with those incarcerated, and
personnel policies that terminate the worst violators while promoting
conscientious officers.135

2.

The Consent Decree

In October 2015, a consent decree was reached in Nunez that
required a drastic overhaul of the DOC in order to fundamentally
reform the DOC’s culture of violence.136 The consent decree outlined
provisions around use-of-force training, anonymous and accurate
reporting and investigation procedures, increased video surveillance,
and greater accountability for staff.137 The USAO joined the Nunez
settlement to ensure that the reforms would also apply to the
adolescents held on Rikers Island.138 This litigation and consent
decree provide the most comprehensive reform action to date,
requiring reforms across a number of policy and procedure areas for
the entire DOC and specific measures for sixteen to eighteen-yearolds held in city jails.
First, the Nunez consent decree set robust requirements for
developing a new use-of-force policy, including requirements for
reporting use of force and conducting complete and timely
investigations of use of force and other violent incidents.139 Meeting
these requirements involves designating a Use-of-Force Auditor to be
responsible for analyzing all data relating to use of force incidents and
identifying trends and patterns.140 The DOC is also required to
develop a new computerized case management system to track data
relating to all violent incidents (including alleged sexual assault)
involving COs in a centralized manner.141 A centralized system must
also be developed to allow correctional staff to anonymously report

134. Id. at 3.
135. Id.
136. See Consent Judgement, supra note 129.
137. See generally id.
138. United States’ Motion to Intervene Pursuant to the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.C. § 1997, Nunez & United States v. City of New
York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 18, 2014) (No. 179).
139. See Consent Judgment, supra note 129, at 10–15.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. at 33.
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all incidents of institutionalized violence.142 The DOC must retain an
outside consultant to conduct an independent review of the DOC’s
infractions processes and procedures.143
Second, the consent decree requires the DOC to take all necessary
steps to impose appropriate and meaningful staff discipline, up to and
including termination, when COs engage in the excessive or
unnecessary use of force or otherwise violate the use-of-force
policy.144 This system must include standardized guidelines to impose
such appropriate and meaningful discipline, including a range of
penalties and a system of progressive disciplinary sanctions.145 The
DOC must also develop a system, subject to the Monitor’s review and
approval, to identify, as soon as possible, COs whose conduct may
warrant corrective actions or raise systemic policy or training
deficiencies.146 Prior to promotions, the DOC must also undertake a
review of an officer’s prior involvement in use-of-force incidents to
verify that this does not raise concerns about the officer’s
qualifications.147
Third, the DOC must install a comprehensive video surveillance
program.148
This includes installing stationary wall-mounted
surveillance cameras to ensure complete camera coverage in all areas
of all facilities by February 28, 2018.149 The DOC must also pilot
body-worn cameras in specific areas across the jail facilities, including
intake, the mental health observation units, punitive segregation
units, young inmate housing units, and other areas that have high
violence or staff-on-inmate contact rates.150 Finally, DOC is required
to designate a supervisor to maintain cameras and monitors and
preserve all video for at least ninety days generally and for four years
after an incident.151
Fourth, the consent decree requires the DOC to develop and
implement a number of new pre-service and in-service training
programs, as well as strengthen and improve existing training
programs addressing a variety of subject matters. New policy and

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 25.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 31.
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procedure training modules are required in the following areas: use of
force; crisis intervention and conflict resolution; probe team response
to emergency situations and alarms; defensive tactics; cell extraction
policies and procedures; and procedures, skills, and techniques for
investigations.152 In addition, new trainings are also required in the
areas of young inmate management, and direct supervision as well as
retraining when a staff member violates the use-of-force policy.153
Fifth, the consent decree requires the DOC to develop a
comprehensive staff recruitment program to attract well-qualified
applicants and to employ an objective process to select and hire
staff.154
Sixth, the consent decree outlines a number of provisions specific
to the safety and supervision of those under the age of nineteen held
at the DOC.155 The consent decree requires officers to supervise
young people at all times to protect them from an unreasonable risk
of harm, and requires officers to inspect housing areas daily to ensure
safe and secure conditions.156 The consent decree also requires the
development of an age appropriate classification tool specifically for
sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.157 A classification tool measures
the incarcerated person’s risk of violence while in the jail system.158
Such a tool will separate those at high and low risk of violence in
addition to separating sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds from
adults.159 The long-standing classification model for the DOC has
been to assign detainees a score according to age, severity of charge
and previous convictions, history of escape, past institutional conduct,
gang affiliation, and number of prior arrests and felonies.160
According to their score, each inmate is classified as minimum,
medium, or maximum custody, and housed accordingly, with
reclassification occurring every sixty days.161

152. Id. at 35–38.
153. Id. at 38–39.
154. Id. at 33.
155. Id. at 40.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 41.
160. First Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 92, Nunez & United States
v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 269) [hereinafter First
Monitors Report] (reporting on the first monitoring period of October 22, 2015
through February 26, 2016 and filed on May 31, 2016).
161. Id.
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It also mandates there be a sufficient level of programming for
young people consistent with best practices.162 The DOC is required
to take appropriate action to protect vulnerable young people and
when the individual, family, or attorney expresses concern, that
individual should be placed in secure housing.163 Moreover, those
individuals under the age of eighteen shall no longer be placed in
punitive segregation or isolation and the DOC should develop
systems, policies and procedures to incentivize positive behaviors and
to address disciplinary issues while not compromising the safety of
staff and other inmates.164 Finally, the Mayor’s Office of Criminal
Justice is required to make best efforts to identify an alternative
housing site not on Rikers Island for those under the age of
eighteen.165
Seventh, the consent decree outlines the monitoring provisions,
including requiring the DOC to submit progress reports to the
Monitor and plaintiff’s counsel.166 The Monitor is also appointed, and
access to information is established.167 The Monitor is required to
submit a report, at the end of each reporting period, evaluating the
DOC’s progress towards compliance.168

3.

The Monitor

The Monitor is tasked with reviewing the reforms undertaken by
the DOC within the major operational areas addressed by the consent
decree, discussed above, and reporting progress to the court twice a
year.169 Overall, the Monitor has found the DOC to be committed to
reform and cooperative in efforts to reach it. However, all of the
Monitor’s reports to date have expressed concern regarding whether
the DOC lacks sufficient staffing, management, and space resources
to sustain the new policies and procedures.170 The resignation of
DOC Commissioner Joseph Ponte in May 2017 only contributes to

162. Id. at 40.
163. Id. at 41.
164. Id. at 44.
165. Id. at 46.
166. Id. at 54–55.
167. Id. at 51–52.
168. Id. at 54.
169. Id. at 51.
170. Fourth Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 17, Nunez & United
States v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 305) [hereinafter Fourth
Monitors Report] (reporting on the fourth monitoring period of January 1, 2017
through June 30, 2017 and filed on October 10, 2017).
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the challenges.171 While the Monitor has found that progress has
been made in some areas, there are remaining challenges facing the
DOC in their efforts to reach substantial compliance, as discussed
below.

a.

Accountability: Reporting, Investigations, and Discipline

A critical area for reform under the consent decree is the use of
force by staff against those detained. The DOC, working with the
Monitor, has developed a new directive, effective October 2017 that
addresses all reporting requirements.172 The development of this new
use-of-force directive has been a priority for the Monitor.173 The
directive outlines both permissive and impermissive use of force by
staff.174
The Monitor found that the DOC has made several strides in its
efforts to curb violence and inappropriate behavior and implement a
new and more robust use of force directive. First, the DOC has
appropriately and thoughtfully advised its staff about the
implementation of the new directive.175 In addition, the messaging
campaign for the training program was creative, constructive, and
conveyed a positive and productive message.176
Second, the DOC has made efforts to more accurately and reliably
track incidents of violence and inappropriate use of force through
more structured internal oversight.177 For example, the DOC has
made improvements to its methods of data collection and utilization,
which enables it to better understand and respond to the ways in
which the staff uses force in the jails.178 In March of 2016, the DOC

171. Michael Schwirtz & William K. Rashbaum, Joseph Ponte to Resign as New
York City Jails Chief, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/

2017/05/11/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-joseph-ponte-correction-commissioner.html
[https://nyti.ms/2q7EIW2]. Acting Commissioner Cynthia Brann was appointed
DOC Commissioner by Mayor de Blasio on October 3, 2017. J. David Goodman, De
Blasio Appoints Acting Commissioner to Head City Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/nyregion/jails-rikers-correction-commissionercynthia-brann.html [https://nyti.ms/2xQP4eL].
172. See Consent Judgment, supra note 129, at 10.
173. Id. at 5.
174. Id.
175. Third Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 42, Nunez & United
States v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 295) [hereinafter Third
Monitors Report] (reporting on the third monitoring period of August 1, 2016
through December 31, 2016 and filed on April 3, 2017).
176. Id.
177. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 13.
178. Id.
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implemented an anonymous reporting hotline to provide a
confidential space for reporting use-of-force violations.179 This
hotline is in addition to already available mechanisms for reporting
alleged use-of-force policy violations such as calling 311, notifying the
Department of Investigation, and alerting Legal Aid, among
others.180 The DOC also hired a Use-of-Force Auditor, who began
working at the DOC in August 2016 and reports directly to the
commissioner.181 The Monitor has been impressed with the analysis
the Use-of-Force Auditor has demonstrated in his quarterly
reports.182
Further, in early 2016, the DOC contracted with Jeffrey A. Beard,
Ph.D., former secretary of the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, to conduct an independent review of its use-offorce infraction process and procedures, which the DOC and
monitoring team are considering reforming.183 The DOC has also
been building a case management system (“CMS”) to gather, track
and report use-of-force data, but it is not yet complete.184 The
Monitor has found the in-progress CMS to be robust and believes it
will surpass the requirements outlined by the consent decree.185
Fourth, the DOC has developed a draft of the New Disciplinary
Guidelines Policy addressing all of the specific discipline
requirements under the consent decree. These guidelines were to
take effect on October 27, 2017, which is thirty days after the effective
date of the new use-of-force directive.186 The DOC also recruited and
hired a Deputy Risk Manager who will be responsible for developing
and implementing risk mitigation systems to achieve the goals of this
provision.187
Finally, the DOC is on track to meet the deadline to install
additional wall-mounted cameras but has requested an extension for
the body-worn camera pilot project.188

179. See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 98.
180. Id. at 99.
181. Second Report of the Nunez Independent Monitor at 119, Nunez & United
States v. City of New York, 11-cv-5845 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 291) [hereinafter
Second Monitors Report] (reporting on the second monitoring period of March 1,
2016 through July 31, 2016 and filed on October 31, 2016).
182. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 157.
183. See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 236.
184. Id. at 172.
185. Id. at 173.
186. Id. at 184.
187. Id. at 162.
188. Id. at 100, 102–03.
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Despite this progress, the Monitor has also identified areas in need
of improvement. The Monitor noted that while the DOC has made
progress in addressing use of force, there remains a deeply
entrenched culture of managing difficult or dangerous inmates with
an iron fist.189 To overcome these challenges, the Monitor urges the
DOC to hire additional staff to support the Use-of-Force Auditor’s
efforts.190 Additionally, to support the DOC’s progress, the Monitor
recommends creating high-ranking uniformed liaisons from each unit
to participate in the Nunez Compliance Unit that was created within
the DOC to ensure adherence to the consent decree terms.191 The
Monitor also recommends creating full-time, continuous positions
within the Nunez Compliance Unit for civilian staff and uniformed
staff at all ranks.192 Further, the Monitor has expressed concern
regarding the use of hand-held cameras to capture use-of-force
incidents, finding that footage often was not captured because staff
were either not bringing cameras to the scene or not adequately
filming the incident.193 As such, the Monitor continues to urge the
DOC to hold staff more accountable when it comes to filming use-offorce incidents.194

b.

Workforce: Recruiting, Training, and Promotions

The Monitor has observed several positive developments in terms
of workforce recruiting, training, and promotions. First, the Monitor
has observed significant improvements in the DOC’s efforts to
strengthen its recruiting and hiring practices in order to reduce
violence. For instance, as a part of this process, the Recruitment Unit
brought on a new human resources director in May of 2016, and
developed a profile for an “ideal candidate” for the DOC, including
criteria for leadership and communication styles, physical attributes,
and experience.195 In 2015, the DOC also created a Recruiter
Training Manual to specifically outline the ideal candidate profile and
describe overall recruitment goals, strengths, challenges, threats, and
opportunities.196 This manual was accompanied by a new training
program for recruitment staff as well as an updated external presence

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 157.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 7.
Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 112.
See First Monitors Report, supra note 160, at 113.
Id.
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for the DOC, including a revamped DOC website and marketing
campaign.197 By prioritizing engagement with potential recruits
through career fairs and community events, the Recruitment Unit
substantially increased the number of candidates taking the required
exam and applying for staff positions.198
Second, the Monitor noted that the DOC has made strides in
attracting a much stronger candidate pool,199 a crucial step towards
creating a more competitive and high-quality DOC workforce. For
instance, new leadership at the Applicant Investigation Unit (“AIU”)
has focused on building up the capacity of the unit to improve the
screening of applicants. The AIU has grown dramatically, from four
to eighty-seven civilian staff members, and has created a system
whereby uniformed staff can provide support as needed.200
Third, the Monitor also confirmed that the DOC continues to
maintain an objective process for selection and hiring that adheres to
clearly identified standards, criteria, and other selection parameters
established by laws and regulations.201 The AIU has developed an
objective screening process that assesses candidates based on
employment history, criminal history, relationships with gangs or
current inmates, medical screenings, and credit and background
checks.202 This objective process also includes automatic disqualifiers
like work dismissals, arrests, and driving violations.203 The AIU has
also expanded its medical and psychological testing team to conduct
those screenings.204
Fourth, the Monitor also found that the DOC’s policies on
promotions are now consistent with the consent decree, and a review
of recent promotions has demonstrated that the policies are being
adhered to.205
The Monitor has also highlighted several areas for improvement.
First, the Monitor has expressed concern over scenarios where AIU
primary investigators have raised red flags for several candidates and
Id.
See Second Monitors Report, supra note 181, at 156–57.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 245.
Colby Hamilton & Gloria Pazmino, With New Officers at Rikers, City Seeks
to Change a Harmful Culture, POLITICO (May 24, 2016), http://www.politico.com/
197.
198.
199.
200.

states/new-york/city-hall/story/2016/05/with-new-officers-at-rikers-city-seeks-tochange-a-harmful-culture-102086 [http://perma.cc/E44M-AKRF].
201. See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 242.
202. See First Monitors Report, supra note 160, at 116.
203. Id. at 115–16.
204. See Second Monitors Report, supra note 181, at 158.
205. See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 194.
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then proceeded to hire them without any documented explanation of
why the red flag was disregarded or overridden.206 Examples of these
red flags included criminal histories, contact with inmates on Rikers, a
history of domestic violence, and failed psychological screenings for
other city jobs.207
The Monitor investigated these specific
applications and found that the AIU’s decisions to overlook the red
flags were reasonable, but stressed the need to document the reasons
for these decisions.208
Second, the Monitor has also found that due to the unprecedented
volume of training efforts and resources required, the original oneyear deadline set in the consent decree is unrealistic.209 Not only does
the DOC need to cover operations while staff are being trained, but
they also do not have adequate space for training.210 The Monitor has
consistently and strongly urged the City of New York to create a new
training facility for the DOC; lack of quality training space has made
it incredibly difficult for the DOC to carry out the training
requirements of the consent decree.211 To its credit, the city has also
included $100 million in the fiscal year 2018 budget for a new training
academy.212 That said, the DOC has requested an extension to the
deadline for training requirements.213

c.

Young Inmate Management—Classification and Programming

In the fourth monitors report, it is noted that young inmates under
the age of nineteen continue to contribute to a disproportionate share
of both the DOC’s use-of-force and inmate-on-inmate violence.214
However, the DOC had made significant progress in increasing
programming for young people, which reduces idle time and, in turn,
reduces violence.215
First, the DOC began working with an external consultant shortly
after the conclusion of the most recent monitoring period in order to
validate the existing classification tool.216 The DOC also recently

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See Second Monitors Report, supra note 181, at 160.
Id.
Id.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 71.
Id.
Id. at 7.
See SMALLER, SAFER, FAIRER, supra note 20, at 36.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 72.
See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 14.
Id.
Id. at 214.
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devised and began using an evidence-based classification model
known as the Housing Unit Balancer (“HUB”).217 This tool was
developed based on the analysis of approximately 60,000 DOC
inmate records (including adolescent males), and uses a conditional
(“if, then”) decision tree model to classify inmates according to
violent conduct, mental health issues, age, severity of charge, gangaffiliation, and number of prior arrests.218 Under the HUB model,
inmates are assessed every 100 days, or after each violent incident,
and classified as minimum, minimum-medium, medium-maximum, or
maximum, and housed accordingly.219 The HUB system has an
override mechanism, so that both adult and adolescent inmates with
special circumstances (such mental health issues or emotional
immaturity) can be placed in the appropriate housing option.220 The
DOC plans to ultimately use this classification system across all DOC
facilities, for all populations.221
However, the Monitor has expressed concern in areas related to
young adult classification and programming. Moreover, the DOC’s
new HUB classification system has been determined unfit for
classifying adolescents, and the DOC must either create a new,
evidence-based classification instrument from scratch or pilot a model
currently used in another context for classifying adolescents.222
Second, the DOC has been working with the Monitor to develop
plans to deliver direct supervision training to staff,223 but it is
important to note that the physical layout of all existing facilities on
Rikers Island and the Brooklyn House of Detention are not in line
with the design requirements of direct supervision, which will make
adoption of this training model more challenging than in a more
modern facility.224
Finally, in addition to the previous abolition of the practice of
punitive segregation for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds in
December 2014, the DOC abolished the use of punitive segregation
for eighteen-year-old inmates on June 30, 2016.225 In earlier reviews,
the Monitor expressed concern about the sustainability of this

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See First Monitors Report, supra note 160, at 92.
Id. at 92–93.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 93.
See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 214–15.
See id. at 86.
See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 77.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 218.
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practice since other disciplinary sanctions had not been fleshed out.226
By the end of the third monitoring period, the DOC demonstrated
promising efforts to increase alternative forms of discipline for young
inmates.227 But the Monitor warned that alternative disciplinary
programs, such as cognitive behavioral therapy, are a drastic shift
from the DOC’s status quo and will need significant time to become a
successful replacement.228
C.

Current Agenda for Reform

Throughout the years, the strongest sources pushing for DOC
reform have been the courts and legal advocates, through litigation
efforts. This kind of litigation strategy is popular across the United
States: at one point, nearly one third of large U.S. prisons were under
court orders to address unconstitutional conditions of confinement.229
One of the primary purposes of litigation is to deter unacceptable
conduct or conditions, and specifically in the case of corrections, it
can serve to create a space where inmates are treated with respect
and as citizens.230
However, the DOC has historically not treated settlements as
essential tools to help guide long-term structural reforms. The key
examples of the DOC’s litigation history from Rhem to Benjamin and
Fisher to Nunez—though by no means an exhaustive account—reveal
a pattern of illegal treatment of incarcerated people followed by
successful lawsuits against the DOC that resulted in piecemeal
responses rather than a holistic strategy for reform.231 This stems
partly from a consistent turnover of DOC leadership and outside
experts as well as an absence of strong reform precedents in the
DOC.232 That said, the presence of the Nunez Monitor, the release of
the Commission’s report, and the mayor’s commitment to closing
Rikers Island all present critical opportunities to implement
comprehensive reforms at the DOC.
As previously mentioned, the Commission recommended closing
Rikers Island and redeveloping borough-based jails in order to create

See Second Monitors Report, supra note 181, at 142.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 226.
Id. at 219.
Wayne N. Welsh, The Dynamics of Jail Reform Litigation: A Comparative
Analysis of Litigation in California Counties, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 591, 591 (1992).
230. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1666
226.
227.
228.
229.

(2003).
231. See generally Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 95.
232. See Dilulio, supra note 65, at 154–55.
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a smaller, safer, more humane and effective jail system for New York
City.233
The DOC is a frequent target of public outrage, advocacy, and
legal action.234 But history has shown that even scandal and outrage
are not enough to change the culture of the DOC.235 Lasting change
will require deliberate analysis, strategic planning, and execution over
a long period of time. In order to take full advantage of this rare
opportunity of galvanized political will for closing Rikers Island,
reforming the broader criminal justice system, and building new stateof-the-art borough-based jails, the city and the DOC should prioritize
organizational culture reform.
II. ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE
Part II turns to a critical piece of the comprehensive reform
agenda—culture change. Reforming the DOC culture, and thus,
operations, will be difficult and will not be immediate. But, to fully
realize the mayor’s goal of a smaller, safer, fairer jail system, it is
necessary.
The subsequent sections outline the tenants of organizational
culture change and culture change specific to correctional institutions,
and then focus specifically on five critical areas for developing a
culture change plan, including: accountability in management and
performance; procedures and policies; recruiting and hiring; training
and education; and wellbeing and support. These five areas do not
exhaustively cover the challenges facing the DOC, rather, they are
critical areas to take into account when devising a comprehensive
strategic plan for organizational culture change for the DOC.
A. Changing the Culture at the DOC
The following sections will explore organizational culture and its
relationship to the DOC’s operations. This section first outlines a
process for understanding and evaluating organizational culture.
Next, this section turns to developing a plan for reform. Finally, this
section outlines priority areas for operational reform in order to
fundamentally change the organizational culture in the DOC.

233. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 15; see also discussion
supra Introduction.
234. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 73–75.
235. See generally, e.g., Stipulation of Settlement, supra note 95.
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Understanding Organizational Culture

Understanding organizational culture theory is important when
assessing and developing a reform plan for the DOC. According to
the Competing Values Framework, developed by Kim Cameron and
Robert Quinn, an organization’s culture can be defined by how it
balances its internal and external priorities, or how it values flexibility
and agility versus structure and control.236 Cameron and Quinn
identify four types of organizational culture: adhocracy, market, clan,
and hierarchical.237 Correctional organizations typically fall under the
“hierarchical” category, which describes organizations that are
internally focused and prioritize well-defined responsibilities,
structure, and control over flexibility, collaboration, and agility.238
Another way to categorize organizational culture is according to
Roger Harrison’s four typologies: power orientation, task orientation,
person orientation, and role orientation.239 Role orientation would
appear to be the most apt descriptor of the DOC, as well as of other
public bureaucracies, because it relies on procedures and rules to
maintain order, with fixed rights and privileges for staff that follow
those rules.240
However, organizations are rarely fully consistent or monolithic.
When major elements of an organization, such as its leadership or
mission, change frequently, it is more likely that the organization will
split into differentiated or fragmented cultures—known as
“subcultures.”241 In fact, culture change efforts often reveal extensive
fragmentation of priorities within an organization and can lead to an
“us versus them” attitude that pits different staff divisions against one
another, creating inefficiencies and limiting collaboration.242 The
beliefs, assumptions, and values of these subcultures may be at odds
with each other, ultimately detracting from an overall organizational

236. KIM CAMERON, HAWORTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPETING VALUES
FRAMEWORK
1–2,
https://faculty.mu.edu.sa/public/uploads/1360773197.1216
organizational%20cult125.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBS9-9VGR].
237. Id. at 3.
238. NANCY CEBULA ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CULTURE AND CHANGE
MANAGEMENT: USING APEX TO FACILITATE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 1, 5 (2012),
https://info.nicic.gov/nicrp/system/files/025300.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QM7-DPNL].
239. ROGER HARRISON, Understanding Your Organization’s Character, in
COLLECTED PAPERS OF ROGER HARRISON 1, 7 (1994).
240. Id. at 8–9.
241. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 18.
242. CHRIS INNES, HEALING CORRECTIONS: THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 51
(2015).
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mission.243 When pursuing change in any form, organizational
leadership tends to push forward piecemeal solutions that cannot
produce the desired holistic outcome, and ends up encouraging
different staff groups to isolate themselves deeper into silos.244

2.

How Organizational Culture Develops and Sustains

Cultures in organizations develop through staff interactions as they
learn how to do their jobs according to what the organization has
expected and has deemed effective.245 Grounded in communication,
cultures both show and tell participants the rules of survival in a given
context.246 Culture is largely created unconsciously or covertly,
meaning that the forces that create and maintain culture are generally
invisible.247 There are, however, many observable manifestations that
can shed light on what is happening beneath the surface: culture is
reflected in members’ interpersonal interactions, in the unwritten
rules for getting along, in the climate or mood within a physical space,
in celebrations, and in other ways.248
Once established, culture becomes deep and pervasive.249 Culture
affects an organization’s operations and becomes inextricably linked
to the personality and identity of an organization and its staff.250 At
the deepest level of an organization’s culture lies shared underlying
assumptions about the workplace—theories about “the way things
are” that are not debatable within the context of the organization or
the field.251 Imagining a reality outside of these shared assumptions
can be quite challenging: the longer an organizational culture has
been reinforced, the more difficult it is to change.252 Although
bringing in new members to the organization seemingly offers an
opportunity to reexamine the organization’s culture, new employees
are more likely to adopt the existing culture than to change it.253
When attempts are made to change an organization’s culture, those

243.
244.
245.
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247.

Id. at 88–93.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id.

ROBERT MARSHAK, COVERT PROCESSES AT WORK MANAGING
HIDDEN DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 1 (2006).
248. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 15–16.
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attempts often generate extreme anxiety among its members.254
Members may feel such a change is akin to stripping them of their
“sense of self.”255

3.

Specific Culture Issues in Correctional Organizations

Correctional organizations are often characterized by conflicting
pressures imposed by policy, public opinion, and the organizational
cultural issues endemic to many criminal justice and law enforcement
organizations.256 The DOC certainly experiences these conflicting
pressures.257 The National Institute of Corrections (“NIC”) found
that, across dozens of correctional institutions, the most common
issues between various divisions of staff were low levels of trust and
respect, poor communication, unclear expectations for performance,
and a lack of recognition for achievements.258 Fragmentation of staff
into silos with distinct, and often competing, subcultures is common in
correctional organizations, with tensions found between virtually
every division of staff, both vertically and horizontally.259
Fragmentation can result in poor communication of expectations
between silos, which leads to mutual lack of trust and respect and can
eventually foster an environment that breeds apathy and frustration
towards the organization itself.260
It is not uncommon for
organizations with a fragmented staff to also experience staff conduct
issues such as corruption, sexual abuse, and overuse of force.261
These negative actions could be mitigated through the
implementation of more supportive work environments with
flexibility and discretion built in for officers.262
Correctional organizations focus on preparing staff to react to
catastrophe instantly.263 As a result, they are preoccupied with failure
and reluctant to streamline inefficient processes due to fear of any
gaps or oversights that might lead to disasters, such as an escape or
death.264
For this reason, in addition to being hierarchical
254. Id. at 29.
255. Id.
256. See generally James B. Jacobs & Harold G. Retsky, Prison Guard,
4 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 5, 6–9 (1975).
257. See supra Section I.A.
258. See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 10.
259. See INNES, supra note 242, at 11, 148.
260. Id. at 11.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 13.
263. See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 8–9.
264. Id. at 9.
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establishments, correctional organizations tend to rely on redundancy
and are excessively bureaucratic as a way to eliminate risk.265 Most
correctional organizations are biased towards pre-existing expertise
and skill as a way to respond to crisis, rather than looking to
innovation and new ideas to alter the overall approach of the
organization.266 The DOC is particularly reliant on redundancy as a
security measure; it has a staffing ratio of one officer per incarcerated
individual, which is higher than most staffing ratios at similar
institutions across the country.267

4.

Impacts of Conflict Between Treatment and Custody

All correctional institutions across the world operate under some
sort of custody model, and most incorporate rehabilitation to varying
degrees.268 The custody model is based on the idea that the sole
purpose of corrections is to protect the community by detaining
people who may pose a threat to public safety.269 This approach
requires social distance between staff and inmates: no informal
relationships or affective ties are formed so that staff can exercise
coercive power.270 In an effort to maintain this social distance, staff
must rely on following specific orders and avoiding decisions based on
judgment or nuance—in order for staff’s authority to be perceived as
legitimate, discretionary rule-enforcement is discouraged.271
Performance is assessed objectively according to statistics around
adherence to rules, and success is measured by a low rate of overexertion of force.272 In the custody model, order is maintained
through punitive measures.273 The punitive trend that has existed for
many years in U.S. corrections suggests that U.S. correctional
institutions have been prioritizing the custody model over the
rehabilitative approach to incarceration.274

Id.
Id. at 8–9.
See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 88.
John R. Hepburn & Celesta Albonetti, Role Conflict in Correctional
Institutions: An Empirical Examination of the Treatment-Custody Dilemma Among
Correctional Staff, 17 CRIMINOLOGY 445, 447 (1980).
269. Id. at 446.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 446–47.
273. Id. at 446.
274. See generally Vivien Stern, The International Aspects of U.S. Policies, in
265.
266.
267.
268.

INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT
279 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
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The rehabilitative model for correctional environments requires
staff to develop effective ties with incarcerated persons and enforce
rules with discretion according to a nuanced understanding of inmates
and their behavior.275 Staff still manage the incarcerated population
through communication and some behavioral incentives, but this
requires great technical skill and a strong commitment to these
ideals.276
In contrast to many prisons in Central Europe and Scandinavia,277
which lean very strongly toward rehabilitative principles, most U.S.
institutions over the past several decades have resisted the concept of
rehabilitation in favor of a “tough-on-crime” approach.278 However,
even as incarceration rates have risen, policy changes and litigation
have forced improved conditions of confinement and protections
from punitive action by COs.279 This trend has resulted in somewhat
improved conditions of confinement in places where administrations
have embraced reforms.280 Litigation tends to result in mandated
reforms and restrictions on staff, limiting the coercive power of
COs.281
When COs are expected to perform both custody and treatment
functions, this sets up a conflict of roles for staff.282 Though line
officers are expected to remain socially distant to maintain order, they

275. See generally ROBERT G. LEGER & JOHN R. STRATTON, SOCIOLOGY OF
CORRECTIONS: A BOOK OF READINGS 1–7 (1977).
276. Id. at 446–48.
277. While the Scandinavian philosophy is instructive, it is important to note the
differences between jails and prisons. In the United States, jails are local facilities
that hold individuals pending trial and for sentences of a term of less than a year
while prisons hold individuals sentenced to terms of more than a year. This presents
distinct operational challenges as well as opportunities.
278. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN & ALISON SHAMES, VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE,
SENTENCING AND PRISON PRACTICES IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1, 7 (2013), https://storage.googleapis.com/
vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/sentencing-and-prison-practices-in-germanyand-the-netherlands-implications-for-the-united-states/legacy_downloads/europeanamerican-prison-report-v3.pdf [http://perma.cc/63V2-T839]; Doran Larson, Why
Scandinavian Prisons Are Superior, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 24, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/why-scandinavian-prisonsare-superior/279949/ [http://perma.cc/PBD8-FHTV]; see also supra Section I.A.2.
279. See generally Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Alienation in Prison: An
Examination of the Work Relations of Prison Guards, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 251, 252–53,
256, 264 (1981).
280. James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960–80,
2 CRIME & JUST. 429, 462–63, 465 (1980).
281. See Poole & Regoli, supra note 279, at 252–53.
282. Oscar Grusky, Role Conflict in Organization: A Study of Prison Camp
Officials, 3 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 452, 455 (1959).
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are also increasingly urged to form close, supportive relationships
with inmates and guide them to make their own decisions.283 Custody
goals and rehabilitative goals are typically at odds by definition, and if
organizational leadership does not develop a comprehensive strategy
to integrate the two models, correctional staff will often encounter
role strain and role conflict.284 Role strain refers to the tensions that
an employee experiences when different duties within his or her role
are difficult to achieve simultaneously.285 Role conflict is when one
employee has multiple, distinct roles that are incompatible.286
When faced with too much role conflict, officers are more likely to
revert to the custody model of coercive and punitive control because
its clear guidelines and results can be more easily measured.287 The
adoption of new cultural ideals, such as rehabilitation models, must
be accompanied by a clear and direct tool of measurement for
success.288
For long-term change to take hold, organizations and their staff
must go through a process of reframing and redefining roles and
missions so that old operations no longer seem acceptable.289
Elements of an organization’s culture, such as shared attitudes,
assumptions, beliefs, and behaviors guide individuals in managing
how to work and survive together.290 Since a group’s attitudes,
assumptions, and beliefs develop out of the need for consistency and
meaning, any efforts to adjust an organization’s culture must address
these needs as they progress.291 Unless these elements and functions
are recognized and addressed, the appropriate route to culture
change will never be understood, let alone embraced.292

5.

How Organizations Can Change

Organizational culture is dynamic and can be influenced by a
number of changes to an organization. In some cases, promoting
283. See id. at 470.
284. See Mayer N. Zald, Power Balance and Staff Conflict in Correctional
Institutions, 6 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 22, 23 (1962).
285. William M. Evan, Role Strain and the Norm of Reciprocity in Research
Organizations, 68 AM. J. SOC. 346, 347–48 (1962).
286. Sam Matthews, Lecture on Social Roles, slide 11 (2016), http://core.ecu.edu/
soci/juskaa/SOCI2110/Lectures/structure/sld011.htm [http://perma.cc/SR2A-XQU9].
287. See Jacobs & Retsky, supra note 256, at 6.
288. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 83–88.
289. See INNES, supra note 242, at 8–9.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 9; see also SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 300.
292. See INNES, supra note 242, at 9.
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members of certain subcultures within an organization can spread
that subculture more widely within the organization.293 Culture
change can also be galvanized through scandal or public crisis – when
major issues are brought to light, organizations may seek radical
change in order to survive.294 Moreover, new technologies can be
incorporated that neutralize certain problematic processes that were
once left up to discretion—like body cameras and digitized systems
that flag officers that show signs of abuse or distress.295
Organizations hoping to see lasting change will undoubtedly face
resistance, confusion, and anxiety in the process.296 Culture change
expert Edgar Schein describes five principles that an organization
needs to accept—and be prepared to deal with—in order to effect
true change: (1) staff must feel more survival anxiety, or fear of failing
in their roles, than they feel anxiety about learning new things;
(2) leaders pushing for organizational culture change must focus their
efforts on reducing anxiety related to learning new things (rather than
increasing survival anxiety); (3) goals of the change must be defined
concretely in relation to the specific problems at hand (rather than
merely referred to as “culture change”); (4) new cultural elements
will only be embraced if they lead to positive results and satisfaction;
and (5) cultural change will be at first psychologically painful, so
efforts must be made to ensure psychological safety for staff.297
Creating and sustaining psychological safety for staff is one of the
most crucial components of culture change efforts. Staff within an
organization undergoing culture change often experience many types
of fear: fear of losing power or position, of incompetence, of
punishment, and of losing identity or group membership.298 These
fears are powerful, and collectively can significantly undermine
Thus, successful cultural change in an
reform strategies.299
organization requires the existence of psychological safety.
Psychological safety can be achieved through: the development of a
compelling positive vision; adequate formal and informal training;
involving the learner in managing the process; flexibility for practice;
support groups for processes; and new systems and structures that

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 283.
Id. at 291, 293.
See Consent Judgement, supra note 129, at 29.
See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 300–05.
Id. at 311–13.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 304–05.
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reinforce new ideals.300
These reforms must be rolled out
strategically to create the safety that staff need in order to embrace
change in their organization.301 It is important to note that even if the
correct problems are identified and the staff is willing, change
attempts will fall flat if the organization rushes to implement changes
without taking the necessary time and thought to put together a longterm, sustainable strategy.302

a.

Culture Change in Correctional Systems

The NIC has been investigating and facilitating cultural
assessments and change processes within correctional organizations
since 2000.303 The NIC endorses the principles laid out by change
management expert Dr. John P. Kotter.304 Kotter’s principles have
been incorporated into many successful organizational change
efforts.305 In order for change to occur, Kotter recommends the
following: (1) inspire a sense of urgency amongst critical stakeholders
to create and maintain the momentum required to push change
forward; (2) have a Change Team of respected senior managers who
are committed to the goals of the change; (3) establish an emotionally
charged vision that can be easily communicated, inspires staff, and
addresses their primary fears regarding the change; (4) learn about
each stakeholder’s best interests in order to build buy-in; (5) provide
clear tools for action so that staff are empowered to make the change;
(6) present short-term, achievable milestones and finish them before
moving on; (7) never stop highlighting these achievements and
pushing for further progress; and (8) provide positive reinforcement
for successes to encourage sustainable change.306
The NIC has used these principles as inspiration to create its own
change management model specifically for corrections called
Achieving Performance Excellence Initiative (“APEX”).307 APEX is
a roadmap and toolkit that can help correctional institutions
understand where to begin and what steps are necessary to effect
lasting culture change.308 The APEX model incorporates best

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 306–07.
Id. at 307.
See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 45.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 18.
See id.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
Id.
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practices from organizational change processes in general, with an
emphasis on those that are particularly relevant to correctional
organizations.309 APEX advocates for a system-wide approach that
acknowledges that every piece of the culture change process will
affect every part of the organization.310 The steps of APEX are as
follows: (1) plan and assess; (2) define the goal; (3) organize for
results; (4) plan the implementation strategy; (5) implement the
change management plan; and (6) sustain the change effort.311
Under the APEX model, the first step for any culture change
process is an informal self-assessment.312 Though there are many
existing tools for organizational self-assessment, APEX has created
its own tool specific to corrections called the APEX Assessment
Tools Protocol.313 It includes the APEX Screener, the APEX
Organization Profile, and the APEX Inventory.314 The APEX
Screener is a brief, twenty-four question survey to assess staff’s
concerns and readiness for change.315 The APEX organizational
profile provides questions for leadership and staff that are specifically
targeted at analyzing operations, environment, relationships, and
performance.316 The APEX Inventory offers a more comprehensive
assessment of readiness for change, along with guidance for how
management can operationalize change.317
An assessment of an organization’s culture that is superficial can
end up doing more harm than good. For example, analysis and
decisions based simply on reported data without an understanding of
underlying dynamics will most likely lead to culture change failure.318
Even when a comprehensive analysis is undertaken, if the
organization is not prepared to address the anxiety, anger, and
resistance that this analysis may engender among some of its
members, then culture change will still fail.319
The next step is identifying the goal and objectives of the change
process. APEX recommends a clear definition for why change is
necessary, along with a specific vision for the future of the
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at xiv.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 188.
Id. at 188.
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organization.320 Leadership should then identify specific practices,
behaviors, and procedures that are top priority for the change, as well
as who will be affected and how.321 Most importantly, leadership
needs to consider how it will know when it meets its goals and how to
measure its success.322 Communication is critical to this process:
organizations should develop an “elevator pitch” that can clearly
convey the goals to all staff.323
Organizing for results entails bringing the entire leadership team
on board and creating specific roles to lead the change.324 These roles
would include a specific change leader and supporting change team,
and a steering committee.325 A significant responsibility of the
change leadership is to manage relationships with all stakeholders,
especially with managers who are not directly involved in the
process.326
The change team then develops the detailed implementation plan,
a project management tool for the organization to follow as it goes
through the change process.327 APEX recommends key steps to be
included in this process—such as conducting surveys, focus groups,
and interviews to understand social dynamics in the organization,
identifying successes or failures of any prior change efforts, or coming
up with a communications strategy for the plan—but also recognizing
that there is no single correct way for an organization to undertake
this process.328
The next step is to actually implement the carefully developed
strategic plan.329 APEX recommends having an intervention team
execute the specialized tasks involved in coming up with plans for
specific processes.330 The change team should monitor and track
progress, and keep all staff as informed as possible.331
Communication of why and how changes are being implemented is

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 28.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 32.
Id. at 36.
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perhaps the most important element of any change management
process.332
The final, perhaps most difficult, stage involves sustainability.333
Organizational change can only last if changes are embraced by staff
and accompanied by positive reinforcement as well as ongoing
guidance and training.334 Management must be held accountable for
the success of implemented changes, and progress must be tracked on
an ongoing basis.335

b.

Case Study: Virginia Department of Corrections and a Healing
Environment

Organizational culture change is not a common undertaking for
correctional organizations. However, the Virginia Department of
Corrections (“VADOC”) is currently in the midst of a massive
culture change initiative aimed at creating a “healing environment”
within the agency.336 The initiative began in 2010 when VADOC
began investigating its effectiveness in reducing recidivism within
Virginia’s criminal justice system.337 In an evaluation of its programs
and services, the VADOC recognized that it could only have an
impact on recidivism rates if it assessed and changed its
organizational culture.338
VADOC Director Harold W. Clarke aimed to create a strategic
plan for culture change by assessing staff attitudes and experiences,
how the institution was perceived by external entities, and how care
was received by the incarcerated population.339 All staff members
received specific training on how to participate in the culture change
effort as well as what his or her role would be in carrying out culture
change goals.340 The strategic planning efforts resulted in the
“healing environment”—a cultural model for the organization that
aimed to create productive change for both staff and those
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
See Scott Richeson, Can Corrections Heal? Reducing Recidivism and
Increasing Public Safety in Virginia, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Nov. 2014, at 26, 26–29.
337. See id. at 26.
338. Id. at 27.
339. See generally VA. DEP’T OF CORR., MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SUMMARY
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

ANNUAL REPORT YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 2014 (2014), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/
about/facts/managementInformationSummaries/2014-mis-summary.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7GV5-9T37].
340. See Richeson, supra note 336, at 2.
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incarcerated.341
Unlike “command and control,” this model
prioritized mutual respect and de-escalation techniques to restore
peace in the correctional setting.342 Through the healing environment
model, use of force was deemphasized and a continuum of responses
for various infractions was introduced.343
A key element of VADOC’s healing environment was a practice
known as “Dialogue,” which establishes a structured model for staffwide discussions about the most pressing issues involved in the
culture change process.344 It requires specific training to provide staff
with the skills necessary to listen without judgment, effectively
creating a safe space that encourages staff to share their thoughts and
experiences, and also allows leadership to gauge how culture change
is progressing.345 In Virginia, this training was carried out by
“learning teams,” interdisciplinary groups of staff selected by
leadership in each facility who were trained by Dialogue coaches.346
The critical component of Dialogue is that it does not stop once
culture change efforts have been implemented—it is an ongoing part
of the process and necessary to sustaining positive change.347
The Urban Institute, an economic and social policy think tank, is
currently conducting an evaluation of this initiative at VADOC, and
has released interim data showing that Dialogue has likely led to an
increase in staff support for culture change initiatives at VADOC.348
B.

Developing a Culture Change Plan at the New York City
Department of Correction

As New York City prepares to shutter Rikers Island and move to
new, borough-based facilities, the DOC has a unique opportunity to
reimagine its role and make strides towards a more humane jail
system.349 The goals of such a process would be to dramatically
improve professionalism, mental and emotional balance,
transparency, and accountability in order to significantly reduce
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 3–4.
344. Id. at 3.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. See Press Release, Va. Dep’t of Corr., Urban Institute Completes Third
Employee Survey at Virginia Department of Corrections—VADOC’s Environment,
Recent Culture Change Measured (Feb. 19, 2015), https://vadoc.virginia.gov/news/
press-releases/15Feb19_UISurvey.shtm [http://perma.cc/AT9E-Z6U9].
349. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10.
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violence and improve outcomes. It will require fierce commitment
from leadership and the recognition that culture change is extremely
difficult, as well as acceptance of some risks.350
While the DOC may decide to work with an external consultant to
assess their culture and develop a strategic plan, any culture change
or strategic planning consultants should approach the process as a
discovery process that focuses on asking the right questions and
helping the organization arrive at conclusions on its own.351
Should the DOC choose to undergo an assessment and develop a
comprehensive plan for reform, this Article recommends several
specific areas of focus for analysis: (1) accountability in management
and performance; (2) formal processes and procedures; (3) recruiting
and hiring; (4) training and professionalization of staff; and (5) staff
wellbeing. The following section analyzes each of these areas in turn,
highlighting ongoing, manifest issues at the DOC.

1.

Accountability in Management and Performance

The legitimacy of reform efforts hinges on correctional leadership
at all levels of management taking responsibility for the DOC’s
performance and progress during the process.352 Organizational
leaders must evaluate all levels of their staff according to new culture
ideals and provide them with positive or negative reinforcement in
accordance with their adoption of the new principles.353

a.

Effective Management as the Primary Driver of Accountability

Dramatic changes in performance are more likely if culture change
is led by a “transformational leader”—someone who has the skills to
influence and inspire organizational commitment amongst staff.354
The NIC has developed standards for correctional leadership
known as the Correctional Leadership Competencies for the 21st
Century (“CLC”).355 The CLC holds accountability as one of the key
values of successful correctional management.356 The CLC model

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 38.
Id. at 19.
See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 142.
Id. at 307.
See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 10.
See generally NANCY M. CAMPBELL, NAT’L INST. OF CORR., CORRECTIONAL

LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: EXECUTIVES AND SENIOR–
LEVEL LEADERS (2005), https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/020474.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D7K4-6RXA].
356. Id. at xix.
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identifies key competencies required for executive and senior
leadership, which include: publicly acknowledging and rewarding
behavior that encompasses organizational values; working
strategically with investigators and auditors to enable accurate data
collection and reinforce ethical values; explicitly modeling behaviors
that the organization wants to promote; clearly aligning rewards and
discipline with desired behaviors and values; setting clear boundaries
around acceptable and unacceptable behavior; and addressing
misconduct fairly, decisively, and in a timely manner.357
As discussed previously, the Nunez complaint cited a long history
of the DOC’s failures to select and promote managers with a
commitment to ending violence or to ensure appropriate
investigations and discipline of staff.358 Other recent events highlight
a serious lack of accountability within the DOC’s middlemanagement, who should be setting the standard for staff behavior
and transparency. For example, an August 2016 Daily News report
contained internal documents and anonymous staff accounts claiming
that administrators had been ordering officers to make use-of-force
statistics “go away.”359 At least one of the administrators involved
was later promoted.360
Most critiques of accountability, particularly in the form of
litigation, within the DOC center on its chronic use-of-force issues.361
The DOC’s culture of violence is a frequent target of public outrage,
advocacy, and legal action.362 But the lack of accountability at the
DOC is not limited to the area of violence—the DOC has
underperformed in areas ranging from hiring to investigations to data
tracking to training.363 By failing to take responsibility, management
sends the message to staff that integrity, ethics, and performance are
not top priorities for the DOC. Taking action against misconduct
while rewarding staff who demonstrate the desired cultural principles
can reinforce the culture that the DOC hopes to promote.364

357. Id. at 67.
358. See Amended Complaint, supra note 128, at 14.
359. See Stephen Rex Brown & Reuven Blau, Exclusive: Rikers Island Correction

Bosses Routinely ‘Purge’ Unfavorable Violence Stats to Create Illusion of Reform,
Review Shows, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/exclusive-rikers-island-bosses-cover-violence-stats-article-1.2768232?cid=bitly
[http://perma.cc/8AXS-FD3S].
360. Id.
361. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 4.
362. See supra Part I.
363. See supra Section I.B.
364. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 9.
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Strong Performance Measurement Facilitates Greater
Accountability

A recent trend in performance management in corrections is to
broaden the scope of indicators to include community-based
outcomes as well as departmental outputs.365 In effect, these systems
collect two kinds of data: outputs that departments or programs can
directly control (such as number of classes taught and number of
times COs used alternatives to punitive segregation), and outcomes
that programs and departments can only influence (like recidivism
rates and gainful employment for formerly incarcerated people).366
Organizational leaders must work with staff to help them understand
which indicators they can directly control and are therefore
responsible for, and which they can only influence and therefore
should see as part of the larger picture towards improving the
criminal justice system.367 This requires leaders to demonstrate and
reinforce the link between internal indicators and broader criminal
justice issues, which can connect internal culture change efforts to the
big picture.368
Performance reports must be used as learning opportunities rather
than merely making information available.369 For performance
measurement systems to function most effectively, all staff who are
held accountable to these measures must have structured
opportunities for face-to-face dialogue to raise concerns and
questions with organizational leaders, and they must be involved in
the brainstorming process regarding what should be measured and
the best approaches for measuring.370
The most successful
measurement efforts have leaders who reward staff success frequently
in structured ways: rituals, celebrations, and retreats provide
opportunities for staff to be unified around the purpose of the
performance measurement effort and recognized publicly for their
successes.371

365. KATHE CALLAHAN & KATHRYN KOLBY, IBM CTR. FOR THE BUS. OF GOV’T,
MOVING TOWARD OUTCOME-ORIENTED PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS 7
(2009),
http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files/KlobyReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LUC-SMZW].
366. Id. at 7.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 21.
369. Id. at 22.
370. Id. at 7.
371. Id. at 19–20.

2018]

BEYOND THE ISLAND

419

The most successful performance measurement systems are framed
as part of the “DNA” of the department, and are managed by a
program director with no other responsibilities.372 This sends a
message that performance measurement is enough of a priority to
bring on specialized staff for this purpose.373 This person must be a
“champion of the cause” and have the communications skills
necessary to keep staff on board.374 Correctional organizations with a
clear chain of command with one director who will assess overall
performance are more successful at implementing performance
measurement systems than those with decentralized management
structures.375
Centralized leadership, combined with frequent
meetings and face-to-face interactions, is key to maintaining
compliance across internal departments or units.376
The DOC currently employs a performance measurement system
called Total Efficiency Accountability Management System
(“TEAMS”), which was implemented in 1995 in response to
prevalent inmate-on-inmate violence.377 During the first decade it
was implemented, it drastically improved CO performance.378
However, while it was once a core element of the DOC’s operating
strategy, TEAMS now appears to be used as a monthly check-in
amongst DOC leadership.379 Reform efforts are impossible to sustain
without prioritizing accountability and performance across the DOC,
starting with its leadership.
Ideally, the aim of TEAMS is to connect the roles of staff within
individual units to the mission of the overall agency, rather than
keeping staff in silos.380 To this end, TEAMS sets agency-wide
agendas, and then tracks data and performance reported by staff
according to these agendas by unit.381 TEAMS works by identifying
dozens of monthly performance indicators in the reports collected
related to use of force, inmate violence, use of services, maintenance,

372. Id. at 17, 19.
373. Id. at 17.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 15.
376. Id. at 17.
377. See CAMPBELL, supra note 355, at 170.
378. Id.
379. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 18.
380. See Paul E. O’Connell & Frank Straub, Why the Jails Didn’t Explode, CITY J.,
Spring 1999, https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-jails-didn%E2%80%99t-explode11794.html [https://perma.cc/C5UC-QA7X].
381. Id.
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overtime, and other areas.382 Top uniform and civilian leadership
then create a monthly report that serves as the focus of monthly
TEAMS meetings, during which the leaders of each facility give
presentations to a large group of supervisors who set expectations for
next steps.383 The monthly meetings serve to share progress, identify
problems, and build strategies for improvement among staff.384 The
role of TEAMS in the DOC could be restored to its original strategic
importance as an integrated management tool that is actionable and
broadened to include more levels of staff.385

c.

Integrity of Data

Despite reportedly still having TEAMS in place, investigators and
monitors have found that line staff are not being held accountable by
leadership for inaccurate or incomplete reporting. In particular,
incomplete records on use of force, medical issues, and maintenance
needs have made it impossible for the DOC or any oversight body to
accurately evaluate performance.386 The monitoring team in Nunez
analyzed the DOC’s data reporting processes and found that staff
often do not fill out reports accurately, and that they tend to leave out
important details when reports involve use of force.387
The
incompleteness of the data undermines efforts to measure
performance.388 A commitment to accuracy is critical to tracking and
evaluating the performance of the DOC and its reform efforts.

d.

Using Data as an Evidence Base for Management Decisions

Successful culture change requires organizational leaders to be
explicit about how staff performance will be evaluated and what the
consequences are of not upholding new cultural principles.389 Though
the DOC is currently working with the Monitor to roll out a
centralized CMS to systematically track use-of-force incidents,
management should work closely with all levels of staff in order to
develop appropriate metrics for performance management in all areas

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Third Monitors Report, supra note 175, at 16.
See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 52.
Id. at 20.
See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 48–49.
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in order to increase ownership of department-wide performance
outcomes.390
Currently, the DOC’s system only allows the person filling out a
use-of-force report to provide a single reason for why a use-of-force
incident occurred. This oversimplifies the complex nature of these
incidents and obscures what the motivation and drivers may be.391
The system should be updated to allow for more nuanced accounting
of events. Staff must also be encouraged and rewarded for providing
appropriately detailed information.392 This evidence base will allow
investigators and supervisors alike to understand and address motives
for staff behaviors.
The DOC can also implement an Early Warning System (“EWS”),
which is an evidence-based model of managing staff that could
significantly reduce violence.393 EWSs are a relatively new tool for
corrections, though commonly used by police departments.394 These
systems use data to spot predictive indicators—such as a history of
unprovoked violence, negative human resources performance
reviews, or absenteeism—that a CO will pose a risk to the safety of its
unit.395 However, agencies have had varying degrees of success with
these types of models, depending on the data available.396 The DOC
is currently using existing data streams to try to identify risk while
working with the Monitor to develop its own EWS system.397 The
success of this EWS program will be crucial to the performance of the
DOC.

2.

Policies and Procedures

While the DOC cannot rely fully on its formal processes and
procedures to effect culture change, organizational operations are
integrally related to culture.398 Culture change will require a re-

390.
391.
392.
393.

See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 58–59.
Id. at 35.
See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 40.
See SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EARLY WARNING

SYSTEMS: RESPONDING TO THE PROBLEM POLICE OFFICER 1 (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188565.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC4R-MR2H].
394. See Jack Harne, Identifying At-Risk Officers: Can It Be Done in
Corrections?, 278 NIJ J. 1, 1–3 (2017).
395. Id. at 1.
396. Id.
397. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 150.
398. See generally SYMBOLS AND ARTIFACTS: VIEWS OF THE CORPORATE
LANDSCAPE (Pasquale Gagliardi ed., 1990).
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envisioning of policies and operations that clearly stem from and
reflect the vision for the organization going forward.

a.

Clarifying and Bringing Directives Up to Date

A critical issue is the way the DOC policy is organized, accessed,
and taught to staff. All policy directives can be found on the DOC’s
website, but many are out of date.399
The DOC’s use-of-force directive is a case in point. As noted
above, a new use-of-force directive was introduced in 2016, but it has
not been updated on the organization’s website.400 It is unclear how
staff access directives and how often they are reviewed. For example,
the Nunez Monitor expressed concern for staff’s level of knowledge
and competency around the use-of-force policy.401 The Monitor also
found that the use-of-force directive did not provide specific how-to
guidance for officers, nor did it clearly lay out staff responsibilities.402
Although the Monitor primarily focuses on use of force, any
operational assessment should consider the state of all policy
directives that govern the daily operations of the DOC.
An important step in changing the culture at the DOC would be to
update the directives system and make it easily accessible to staff.
Though updated directives and rules will not alone address the issues
in the DOC, keeping a system of directives that is organized, up to
date, and easy to navigate communicates to staff that adherence to
policies is valuable to the organization, rather than a formality.
It is impossible to guarantee that rules will dictate behavior—in
fact, coercion alone has been shown not to be effective.403 But writing
directives and policies that are as explicitly detailed as possible
eliminates opportunities for interpretation and makes expectations
clear. Having an in-depth understanding of policy is critical for staff
who often need to make discretionary decisions in unpredictable
circumstances.

b.

Using an Evidence Base in Setting Policies and Procedures

Many DOC policies and procedures are not evidence-based
practices and do not set benchmark goals. For example, the DOC

399. See Directives, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/doc/
directives/directives.page [http://perma.cc/F9XL-Z5MT].
400. Id.
401. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 5–6.
402. Id.
403. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 308–09.
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does not have the right metrics available to understand if its new
Enhanced Supervision Housing program is successful at reducing
violence.404 Implementing new programs without a clear sense of
whether or not they will work can backfire. In 2015, the DOC began
a large undertaking to house young adults ages eighteen through
twenty-one separately from the adult population, believing that this
would help reduce violence.405 After spending significant resources to
make this change, which affected every element of the organization
from facilities to programming, it was discovered that violence
increased in this unit.406 The DOC is now in the process of undoing
this policy decision, gradually mixing younger people back in with the
older population.407 Not only is this inefficient from a departmental
resources perspective, but also it has led to additional violence and
trauma for both staff and the incarcerated population that could have
been avoided if evidence had been gathered before the policy
decision had been made. This approach further communicates to
staff that there are not necessarily reasons for implementing certain
policies over others, and thus undermines organizational operations.
An evidence base is particularly important when it comes to
classification of the incarcerated population, especially if the DOC is
to move into a direct supervision model of management.408 The
direct supervision philosophy holds that normalized environments
inspire normal behavior, and that when staff can monitor the entire
incarcerated population at once and are trained to deescalate tension
using communication skills, they can keep violence at bay.409 This
model is effective if strictly adhered to from a design and training

404. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., AN ASSESSMENT OF ENHANCED SUPERVISION
HOUSING x–xi (2017), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/boc/downloads/pdf/Reports/BOCReports/FINAL-BOC-ESH_Assessment-Adults-2017.04.26.pdf
[http://perma.cc/
H9L7-4HFG].
405. See Colby Hamilton & Gloria Pazmino, Department of Correction Seeks to
Delay
Young
Adult
Housing
Plan,
POLITICO
(Dec.
15,
2015),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/city-hall/story/2015/12/department-ofcorrection-seeks-to-delay-young-adult-housing-plan-029159 [http://perma.cc/6Y2VUGRU].
406. See MMR 2016, supra note 57, at 80.
407. See Presentation, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., Presentation to the Board of
Correction on the Young Adult Plan (June 13, 2017), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/
doc/downloads/press-release/BOC_YA_presentation_n.pdf [http://perma.cc/HN9YEGTC].
408. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 236.
409. See RICHARD WENER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PRISONS AND
JAILS 52 (2012).
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perspective.410 There is evidence that jails that use this model can see
a thirty percent to ninety percent reduction in violence.411 The plan
to dramatically reduce the number of people incarcerated in New
York City, close Rikers Island, and refurbish or create new facilities
in the five boroughs presents an ideal opportunity to transition to a
direct supervision model.412 Since direct supervision is based on
reducing staff supervision of the incarcerated population unless it is
too risky to do so, an effective evidence-based classification system is
key for this system to operate safely.413
Generally, committing to the practice of using only evidence-based
tools and policies is paramount to the performance of the agency and
for achieving an organizational culture based on improving outcomes
for the incarcerated population. Employing valid and evidence-based
strategies also contributes to a transparent and procedurally just
culture. Staff should always understand why they are expected to do
certain things, as well as the expected outcome. An important
element of a successful culture change process is that staff feel safe in
their expected roles and are comfortable with the objectives they are
aiming for—this is necessary for staff to buy in to and be on board
with proposed reform strategies.414

3.

Recruiting and Hiring for Culture Change

As the gateway into the organization for new employees, the hiring
and recruiting process is key to any organizational change efforts.
While culture does drive staff behavior, organizational culture itself is
collectively created by the shared experiences and learnings of
staff.415 Staff are an agency’s greatest resource and have a profound
impact on its performance, so it is imperative to hire staff that will be

410. Design principles for a normalized environment include single cells, using
furnishings made of soft rather than indestructible materials, exposure to natural
light, use of therapeutic paint and furnishing colors, and use of sound-minimizing
acoustics. Direct supervision facilities take a unit management approach, dividing
facilities into separate housing units that have their own amenities and recreational
spaces. This approach cuts down on the need to transport inmate’s long distances
through the larger facility and allows staff to become familiar with the incarcerated
people in their given unit. Most importantly, a unit management model provides
incarcerated individuals with much more freedom of movement and allows them to
manage their own time and use of space when possible. See Wener et al., supra note
53, at 11–12.
411. Id. at 2.
412. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 6–7.
413. See Wener et al., supra note 53, at 1–2.
414. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 300–07.
415. Id. at 14–23.
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open to the vision for the organization’s culture.416 The DOC needs
to develop a vision for a new organizational culture and then hire
staff who can help advance changes to make this vision a reality.

a.

A Historically Fraught System

Recruiting and hiring practices at the DOC have likely contributed
to culture issues surrounding staff misconduct and violence. A 2015
report by the New York City Department of Investigation (“DOI”)
found that at least twenty-five percent of the DOC’s staff misconduct
incidents during that year would have been avoided if the DOC had
in place an adequate approach to screening and hiring COs.417 The
DOI’s investigation found problems in the AIU that handles
applications once they have been received by DOC.418 These
problems resulted in the hiring of many COs who should either have
not been hired, or should have been hired under conditions of close
monitoring.419 The potentially disqualifying issues for these new hires
included arrests for harassment, personality disorders, and close ties
to currently incarcerated individuals.420 The AIU staff neither
followed standard background check procedures nor monitored new
hires with previous gang affiliations shared by inmates.421 Moreover,
the investigation found that the approach to hiring was not
strategically linked to the department-wide reform efforts.422
A weak recruiting and hiring process is incredibly costly. In
addition to the dangers posed to inmates, staff who underperform or
engage in misconduct and violence are an incredible financial burden
on an organization.423 In fact, the DOC cost the city nearly $420
million in personal injury settlements from 2009 to 2014.424 Even
more importantly, hiring the wrong staff can completely undermine
416. See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 37; N.Y.C. DEP’T OF INVESTIGATION,
REPORT ON THE RECRUITING AND HIRING PROCESS FOR NEW YORK CITY
CORRECTION OFFICERS 23 (2015) [hereinafter DOI REPORT ON RECRUITING AND
HIRING], https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/doi/downloads/pdf/2015/jan15/pr01rikers_aiu_
011515.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PYA-K27F].
417. See DOI REPORT ON RECRUITING AND HIRING, supra note 416, at 3.
418. Id. at 3–24.
419. Id. at 5.
420. Id. at 1–2.
421. Id. at 2.
422. Id. at 23.
423. Marcia Morgan & Jack E. Smith, Hiring the Right Individual for Your
Corrections Staff, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Aug. 2009, at 22, 22.
424. Office of the N.Y.C. Comptroller, ClaimStat Alert (Aug. 2014),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/ClaimStat-Alert-0814.pdf
[http://perma.cc/JGR3-LGUH].
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any attempt to pursue an organizational culture that prioritizes
rehabilitation and human dignity for those who are incarcerated.

b.

Strategic Hiring for Culture Change

While the DOC is certainly improving its recruitment and hiring
approaches,425 moving to a direct supervision system presents an
opportunity for the DOC to use recruiting and hiring to intentionally
spur changes to the organization’s culture. Key to this process would
be expanding the profile of the “ideal candidate” to diversify the
range of skills and experience of DOC staff.
Currently, the accepted qualifications for COs favor candidates
with military or law enforcement backgrounds.426 As New York
City’s model of incarceration shifts to focus increasingly on
rehabilitation and programming, the DOC’s hiring team might
consider recruiting candidates with experience and training relevant
to these new priorities, including candidates with social work and
mental health backgrounds.
The current requirements for
employment as a CO include: sixty completed college credits (the
equivalent of an associate degree); a high school diploma/GED plus
two years honorable full-time U.S. military service; a high school
diploma/GED plus two years of full time experience as a police
officer, peace officer or its law enforcement equivalent; or six years of
active U.S. Military Reserve service with an honorable discharge.427
A four-year university degree is not a prerequisite for employment,
which makes being a CO an attractive and well-paying profession for
people with only associate degrees or military training.428 However,
the DOC might consider requiring four-year university degrees for
officers working with special populations like youth or those with
mental illness. Higher education helps foster the desire for continued
learning and helps teach the skills and build the capacity necessary for
This is critical in a field like
acquiring new information.429
corrections, which is constantly evolving due to new research, policy,
and societal changes, and which involves working with special
populations like youth and people with mental illness.430 In general,

425. See Consent Judgment, supra note 129, at 33.
426. How to Qualify, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/
jointheboldest/officer/how-to-qualify.page [http://perma.cc/V7UJ-Z7PR].
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. See DON A. JOSI & DALE K. SECHREST, THE CHANGING CAREER OF THE
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 46 (1998).
430. See id.
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having college-level education makes it more likely that COs have
had exposure to a diverse range of backgrounds different from their
own, expanding their capacity for empathy; this exposure to
difference is invaluable to learning potential ways to deescalate
violent incidents.431 In order to recruit and hire the right staff for the
mission and organizational culture the DOC would like to implement,
it should create a comprehensive recruiting and hiring vision replete
with a strategic plan that is directly in line with its overall culture
change goals and efforts. According to the Nunez Monitor, the AIU
is about to undergo a comprehensive review process of all current
practices and will then draft an overall strategy for going forward.432

4.

Training and Education as Tools for Culture Change

A supportive and healing training program can create the
psychological safety needed for staff to accept change, and it can also
position staff as agents of change by helping them develop the skills
necessary to sustain a healing culture in the organization.433 For a
hierarchical structure like the DOC, the process of opening up
dialogue across silos likely will be difficult and uncomfortable at first.
These initial steps should be treated as an opportunity to build skills
and train staff for ongoing dialogues among all levels in the DOC. As
seen in the Virginia Department of Corrections, staff likely will
become accustomed to this new way of working and more willing and
better positioned to contribute to innovation within the DOC.434

a.

Training for a Healing Environment

Training plays a significant role in establishing legitimacy and
procedural justice in a criminal justice setting: when correctional staff
demonstrate competence and fairness in carrying out their jobs, the
incarcerated population may be more likely to respect their
authority.435 New York City’s Police Department is currently
transitioning from a strictly “law and order” approach to a more
Its 2015 Neighborhood
“community-based policing” model.436

431. See Christine Tartaro, Watered Down: Partial Implementation of the New
Generation Jail Philosophy, 86 PRISON J. 284, 297 (2006).
432. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 193.
433. See SCHEIN, supra note 33, at 305–06.
434. See Press Release, Va. Dep’t of Corr., supra note 348.
435. See STEPHEN C. MCGUINN, PRISON MANAGEMENT, PRISON WORKERS, AND

PRISON THEORY: ALIENATION AND POWER 56–57 (2015).
436. See WILLIAM J. BRATTON, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, THE NYPD PLAN OF ACTION
AND THE NEIGHBORHOOD POLICING PLAN: A REALISTIC FRAMEWORK FOR
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Policing Plan emphasizes ongoing respectful engagement with citizens
as the only way to properly maintain safety in the city.437 The DOC
can learn from this initiative by making engagement, communication,
and de-escalation—principles at the core of the direct supervision jail
model—essential parts of its approach to maintaining safety.438
A transition to a direct supervision model would require the DOC
to build its entire training program around techniques that have
typically been considered supplementary training modules. A study
on the full adoption of direct supervision principles in newly designed
jails shows that facilities that focus on only the design elements of
direct supervision, ignoring the training, management, and culture
components, see status quo results in violence prevention.439 In fact,
this happened at the Tombs, which is a direct supervision facility that
has not been able to keep violence down, apparently due to
mismanagement.440 In other cases, partial implementation is due to a
misinterpretation of the direct supervision model, such as only placing
COs in direct contact with inmates without providing a safe physical
environment or ensuring the CO has the requisite communication
skills to control the environment.441 Again, in facilities that have fully
implemented direct supervision principles, violence drops
dramatically.442 In those that adopted direct supervision in design
only, violence was largely unaffected.443
Therefore, the DOC must implement direct supervision
comprehensively.
The difficulty of this task should not be
understated.
The DOC has had, in the past two decades,
commissioners who were committed to change and were able to make
some important and invaluable reforms in the agency.444 The kind of
culture change discussed in this Article will require not just that kind
of leadership, though it is essential, but a long term commitment from
the mayor, the budget director, the Office of Labor Relations, the
CONNECTING POLICE AND COMMUNITIES 1–2 (2015), http://home.nyc.gov/html/nypd/
html/home/POA/pdf/Plan-of-Action.pdf [http://perma.cc/2UMY-ZRWA].
437. See id. at 3.
438. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 88.
439. See Tartaro, supra note 431, at 291.
440. See Surico, supra note 63.
441. See Stephen I. Saunders, III, Direct Supervision Jails: A Management Model
for the 21st Century 3 (Jan. 1995) (unpublished research paper, Florida Criminal
Justice
Executive
Institute),
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FCJEI/Programs/SLP/
Documents/Full-Text/Saunders.aspx [https://perma.cc/X7QK-5VE5].
442. See Wener et al., supra note 53, at 11.
443. See Christine Tartaro, Examining Implementation Issues with New
Generation Jails, 13 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 219, 225–26 (2002).
444. See supra Section I.B.
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Mayor’s Office of Operations, the Department for Citywide
Administrative Services, as well as the city council, among others.
This is no small undertaking and without this kind of substantial
commitment from all levels of city leadership, it is unlikely to happen.

b.

A Healing Environment Will Make Punitive Tools Obsolete

A common criticism from staff at the DOC is that the recent
reduction in the use of punitive measures for dealing with inmates
leaves staff with no tools to curb violence.445 Decades of reliance on
solitary confinement as a primary anti-violence tactic with only
cursory attempts at providing alternatives has left staff feeling
powerless against violence.446 A common response to this dilemma is
to say that officers simply need more training.447
The judicial response also has mirrored this approach. For
example, the consent decree in Nunez calls for many additional
training programs in efforts to reduce violence in the DOC, focusing
on use of force, conflict resolution and crisis intervention, defensive
tactics, cell extractions, as well as procedures, skills, and techniques
for investigating use-of-force incidents.448 Recently, the DOC has
made great strides in rolling out its “Continuum of Alternative
Disciplinary Responses,” and as of this writing is no longer using
punitive segregation at all for sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds.449 This
continuum includes several specialized housing options, depending on
age and infraction, paired with programming aimed at behavioral
change.450 COBA, which represents the COs currently being trained
in these new strategies, strongly prefers the use of punitive
segregation because officers feel vulnerable to violence without it.451
Indeed, while the Monitor has found the drafting and testing of these
new programs to be promising, it has warned that in order for
correctional staff to feel secure without punitive segregation, these

445. See Press Release, Corr. Officers’ Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., COBA President
Elias Husamudeen Regarding the DOC’s Elimination of Punitive Segregation for 18–
21 Year Old Inmates (Oct. 11, 2016) [hereinafter COBA Press Release],
https://www.cobanyc.org/news/immediate-release-coba-president-elias-husamudeenregarding-doc%E2%80%99s-elimination-punitive [https://perma.cc/U37S-8YKU].
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. See Consent Judgment, supra note 129, at 37–40.
449. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 233.
450. Id. at 240.
451. See COBA Press Release, supra note 445.
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new policies must be extremely clear and rolled out carefully.452 The
monitoring team has also stressed that the DOC must expand the
possible responses for mid-level misconduct that would not require
the use of the specialized housing programs but should still be
addressed.453
If implemented properly, the direct supervision model will render
punitive tactics practically obsolete. As mentioned above, through
direct supervision, staff manage inmates using communication, deescalation, as well as relationship-building and leadership skills.454
Direct supervision principles should inform how all staff engage with
the incarcerated population at all times, rather than as an
afterthought.

c.

Redefining Staff Roles Through Professionalization

As noted above, seeking a more professionalized staff by recruiting
officers with higher education qualifications is one approach to
changing the dynamics between COs and the incarcerated
population.455 However, research has found that if underlying
organizational culture issues are not addressed, hiring more educated
and human-service oriented staff has little effect on changing
culture.456 For this approach to be successful, staff must be fully
integrated into strategic development and be fully capable of acting in
accordance with reform goals.457
Job redesign is an approach that concedes more autonomy and
control over operations to lower-level staff, thus providing
opportunities for enrichment through increased responsibility and
challenge in the workplace.458 Staff should be trained with the skills
and knowledge necessary to have more autonomy over their decisionmaking, which can heighten their sense of personal responsibility and
pride in their role.459

452. If punitive segregation is no longer an option, it must be replaced with a clear
program of graduated responses to violent behavior.
453. See Fourth Monitors Report, supra note 170, at 244.
454. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
455. See JOSI & SECHREST, supra note 429, at 46.
456. Nancy C. Jurik & Michael C. Musheno, The Internal Crisis of Corrections:
Professionalization and the Work Environment, 3 JUST. Q. 457, 477 (1986).
457. See generally Richard F. Elmore, Organizational Models of Social Program
Implementation, 26 PUB. POL’Y 188 (1978).
458. See John W. Slocum, Jr., Job Redesign: Improving the Quality of Working
Life 5 (S. Methodist Univ, Working Paper No. 19, 1981).
459. ROGER CHEVALIER, A MANAGER’S GUIDE TO IMPROVING WORKPLACE
PERFORMANCE 65–66 (2007).
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Another approach is to develop an academic program for all staff
that lasts between one and two years and that goes beyond traditional
training modules to include fields such as criminal law, sociology, law
enforcement history, and education.460 In German correctional
institutions, often considered a global model, officers spend their twoyear probationary period learning self-defense and communication, as
well as criminal law and educational theory.461 This professionalizes
staff by providing them with skillsets found in professions requiring
university degrees.462

5.

Wellbeing and Support for Staff

Staff treatment and support are core elements of a positive
organizational culture.463 This is particularly true in corrections
considering the occupational stressors for correctional staff, which
include fear of inmate violence, confrontation with inmate suicides,
requirements to frequently work overtime, and demands of rotating
shifts that can impede life outside of work.464 For correctional
organizations to perform optimally and effectively, staff must be
adequately supported and cared for.465 Adequate training of staff is
also incredibly important to their wellbeing—when staff are
inadequately trained, they can easily find themselves in situations that
cause extreme stress and fear.466
As recommended by the Commission, facilities should provide
normalized spaces for staff that are separate from the incarcerated
population and offer a sense of connection to the outside world.467
The Commission recommended that these spaces would include
natural materials, soft furniture, regular lamps and tables, and other
every day furnishings.468 The value of natural light and temperature
460. Maurice Chammah, The Stiff Competition to Work in German Prisons, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 22, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/22/
the-stiff-competition-to-work-in-german-prisons#.dtvud6iqt [http://perma.cc/7G24VDMZ].
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. See JAIME BROWER, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS DIAGNOSTIC CTR., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WELLNESS AND SAFETY LITERATURE
REVIEW 1 (2013), https://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/spotlight/
download/CorrectionalOfficerWellnessSafety_LitReview.pdf [https://perma.cc/TS3DMPMK]; see also CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at xiii.
464. See BROWER, supra note 463, at 11–13.
465. See CEBULA ET AL., supra note 238, at 48–51.
466. See BROWER, supra note 463, at 1.
467. See A MORE JUST NEW YORK CITY, supra note 10, at 82.
468. Id.
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control was also stressed.469 However, as with other improvements
related to physical facilities, the changes will mean little without a
complete overhaul of how staff wellbeing and health are considered
within the DOC.
Moreover, role conflict and unsupportive leadership can lead to
many other conditions that afflict staff as they attempt to manage
their relationships to their jobs and to their organization. For
instance, burnout is a syndrome of emotional exhaustion,
depersonalization, and a reduced sense of personal accomplishment
that is a considerable risk for correctional staff.470 Studies have
shown that of all correctional personnel, staff in custody roles report
higher levels of burnout.471
Beyond being unpleasant, burnout can lead to officers becoming
careless on the job and can pose risks to the safety of the correctional
institution.472 This is an argument for providing ample support,
challenge, and autonomy early in a CO’s career, when they are at
greater risk of burning out.
Though seniority on staff comes with benefits and perks, some of
these may also be harmful. For example, overtime allows officers to
dramatically increase their wages; however, excessive overtime takes
an emotional and physical toll on COs.473 The DOC has become
dependent on overtime as a way to staff posts, particularly when
officers need to miss shifts for training, and frames it as a “perk” even
though it can be harmful to officers in the long run.474
Developing and maintaining a supportive and healing culture is
critical to staff wellbeing. Jails are trauma-inducing environments.475
The average CO will encounter twenty-eight first-hand events related

469. Id.
470. See Caitlin Finney et al., Organizational Stressors Associated with Job Stress
and Burnout in Correctional Officers: A Systematic Review, 82 BMC PUB. HEALTH
1, 1 (2013).
471. See Marie L. Griffin et al., Job Involvement, Job Stress, Job Satisfaction, and
Organizational Commitment and the Burnout of Correctional Staff, 32 CRIM. JUST.
BEHAV. 239, 241 (2010).
472. See BROWER, supra note 463, at 11.
473. Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Rikers Jail Costs Soared Despite Fewer
Inmates, Comptroller Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
2014/10/17/nyregion/rikers-jail-costs-soared-despite-fewer-inmates-comptrollerfinds.html [https://nyti.ms/2FWNqvy].
474. See id.; see also David A. Fullard, Fixing Jail Violence Means Worrying
About Officers’ Health, CITY LIMITS (Nov. 7, 2014), https://citylimits.org/2014/11/07/
fixing-jail-violence-means-worrying-about-officers-health/
[http://perma.cc/VY4EFLF3].
475. Fullard, supra note 474.
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to serious violence, injury, or death within his or her career.476 Unlike
police officers, COs experience a sustained threat of violence, and
have fewer opportunities to build rewarding relationships with the
populations they work with, given that those populations are being
held against their will.477 Staff who are exposed to events involving
violence, injury, or death on a recurring basis are more likely to
develop post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and depressive
disorders.478 These disorders can have dire consequences for staff—
one study found that COs’ suicide rate is thirty-nine percent greater
than other professions, and double the rate of police officers.479
The DOC should be proactive when it comes to ensuring the
wellbeing of its staff. When COs are happy, healthy, adequately
trained, and well-supported, they create a more positive and
supportive environment for incarcerated people, and can improve
behavior while reducing violence and the need for punitive measures.
These benefits, which serve both individuals and the organization,
however, can only be achieved with meaningful commitment from
leadership.480
Currently, the DOC has a unit called the Correction Assistance
Response for Employees (“CARE”). The CARE unit exists to assist
officers who seek counseling around traumatic experiences, anxiety,
PTSD, and job-related stressors, among other needs.481 Officers
needing additional services or treatment are referred elsewhere by
the unit.482 However, there is a strong stigma in correctional culture
against seeking mental health treatment. David Fullard describes a
“warrior ethos” in corrections, where COs are expected by their peers
and supervisions to never show weakness, accept defeat, quit, or
admit illness, making it much less likely that staff will seek help to
cope with the extreme stress of the job.483 An additional challenge
with internal CARE units is that they may be perceived as an
476. Id.
477. See BROWER, supra note 463, at 5.
478. MICHAEL D. DENHOF & CATERINA G. SPINARIS, DESERT WATERS CORR.
OUTREACH, PREVALENCE OF TRAUMA-RELATED HEALTH CONDITIONS IN
CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS: A PROFILE OF MICHIGAN CORRECTIONS ORGANIZATION
MEMBERS 2 (2016), http://www.mco-seiu.org/files/2016/05/MCO-Paper_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B49U-4KJK].
479. See BROWER, supra note 463, at 12.
480. See Griffin et al., supra note 471, at 252.
481. See Correction Assistance Response for Employees, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR.,
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/jointheboldest/overview/correction-assistance-response-foremployees.page [http://perma.cc/3WCZ-SXL4].
482. Id.
483. See Fullard, supra note 474.
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extension of the organization, and therefore may not be as trusted by
staff who are dealing with issues resulting from organizational
stressors.484 One solution may be off-site facilities with strict
confidentiality regulations that ensure the DOC is only informed of
mental health issues in extreme cases.
A critical part of a larger culture change effort would be to help
shift the stigma around mental health within its own organizational
culture.485 Though seemingly insignificant, vocabulary around mental
health has a large impact on staff perception and says a lot about its
culture.486
The DOC can seek to normalize and neutralize
conversations around mental health and incorporate healing practices
such as the Dialogue process (discussed in earlier sections)487 into its
operational status quo. Peer support programs, or “stress units,” can
be especially helpful in fields prone to PTSD and where stressors are
often shared.488 Stress units are group meetings led by peer mentors
under mental health professional supervision where staff can discuss
daily challenges or seek guidance for more serious incidents.489 These
sessions can be more comfortable and successful than formal mental
health services, which are often stigmatized.490
The DOC’s
organizational culture should strive to be one that encourages
dialogue, reflection, and sharing of both positive and negative
experiences. This will create a healthier jail system for all.
CONCLUSION
The recent announcement of the eventual closure of Rikers Island
marked a watershed moment in corrections in New York City and on
a national scale.491 There is an unprecedented amount of public and
governmental support for eliminating Rikers—a penal colony plagued
by a history of violence, abuse, and despair for the incarcerated
population and DOC staff alike.492 But simply building new jails off
the island will not automatically result in a reformed DOC. Better
outcomes for staff and incarcerated people in New York City requires
a complete rethinking of the DOC’s organizational culture, including
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See BROWER, supra note 463, at 15.
See id. at 9–12.
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clarifying how the DOC operates and behaves, its values, and what its
ultimate goals are.493 Regardless of where the new facilities are
located and how they are designed, the DOC must seize this historic
opportunity to transform itself holistically.
Much of the operational reforms over the last fifty years at the
DOC have been the result of litigation and consent decrees.494 While
litigation can have an impact on operations, particularly in developing
minimum standards to govern department operations, it cannot force
the holistic reforms necessary to make lasting change at the DOC.495
After decades of litigation and corresponding consent decrees, the
Nunez case and consent decree forced larger-scale reforms at the
DOC.496 The Nunez monitoring team is working closely with the city
and the DOC to develop and implement reforms across a host of core
functions including hiring, training, and use of force.497 However,
these reforms are being devised under the relatively narrow scope of
the litigation rather than being contemplated as a sustainable reform
strategy.498
Comprehensive reform—the kind of reform that can stop endemic
violence and truly change treatment and conditions in DOC
facilities—involves more than just remaking the DOC’s physical
space. The DOC must, in many respects, start anew and rebuild itself
by developing and carefully executing a strategic change management
plan.499 Critical to this plan, and its ultimate success, will be the
DOC’s deliberate analysis of its current organizational culture and
the impact of that culture on daily operations.500
In order for operational reforms to take hold in the long-term,
organizational culture change must also be addressed.501 A proactive
and supportive environment for staff and management will allow the
operational reforms to be successful. This Article has described the
litigation and reform history at the DOC, the theory underlying
culture change in correctional facilities, as well as certain critical areas
of operational reform.502 The five areas of focus outlined in this

493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.

See MMR 2017, supra note 26, at 83.
See supra Part I.
See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.B.
See supra Section I.B.2.
See supra Section I.C.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.

436

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLV

report—accountability in management and performance, procedures
and policies, recruiting and hiring, training and education, and
wellbeing and support—do not exhaustively cover the challenges
facing the DOC.503 Rather, they are key areas to take into account
when devising a strategic plan for the DOC’s organizational culture
change.
Unless the DOC reforms its organizational culture, the broader
criminal justice reforms and the development of new jail facilities will
bring the DOC only so far. The abuse and troubling conditions of
confinement will continue, simply moving off the island into the new
facilities along with the staff and those who are detained.

503. See supra Sections II.B.1–5.

